Internet Traffic Begins to Bypass the U.S.

Internet Traffic Begins to Bypass the U.S.

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• SAN FRANCISCO — The era of the American Internet is ending.
• By JOHN MARKOFF

Published: August 29, 2008 - Skip to next paragraph

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“Suppose the Internet was entirely confined to the U.S., which it once was? That wasn’t helpful,” said Vint Cerf of Google.

Invented by American computer scientists during the 1970s, the Internet has been embraced around the globe. During the network’s first three decades, most Internet traffic flowed through the United States. In many cases, data sent between two locations within a given country also passed through the United States.Engineers who help run the Internet said that it would have been impossible for the United States to maintain its hegemony over the long run because of the very nature of the Internet; it has no central point of control.

And now, the balance of power is shifting. Data is increasingly flowing around the United States, which may have intelligence — and conceivably military — consequences.

American intelligence officials have warned about this shift. “Because of the nature of global telecommunications, we are playing with a tremendous home-field advantage, and we need to exploit that edge,” Michael V. Hayden, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2006. “We also need to protect that edge, and we need to protect those who provide it to us.”Indeed, Internet industry executives and government officials have acknowledged that Internet traffic passing through the switching equipment of companies based in the United States has proved a distinct advantage for American intelligence agencies. In December 2005, The New York Times reported that the National Security Agency had established a program with the cooperation of American telecommunications firms that included the interception of foreign Internet communications.

How one man eased nerves on Iran : Martin Chulov, Middle East correspondent | December 10, 2007

ON a winter afternoon in February, Ali Reza Ashgari, a moustachioed Iranian general, checked into a hotel in Istanbul, booked for him by two Europeans. Several days earlier, his wife and children had slipped quietly out of Tehran, unlikely to return. Ashgari has been in the hands of the CIA ever since, apparently a willing partner to its desperate and often futile attempt to learn just what Iran had in mind with its nuclear program and to glean the regional ambitions of its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ashgari was deputy defence minister in Tehran, as well as commander of the Revolutionary Guard, and keeper of many of the regime's secrets, including a detailed knowledge of its backing of the Shia militia in Lebanon, Hezbollah. But nothing that Ashgari could offer up was more central to US concerns than what he knew about Tehran's nuclear intentions.

Exactly what Ashgari has told the Americans since is not entirely clear. However, two things are apparent in the minds of intelligence allies in the Middle East: he was instrumental in confirming worst fears that Iran intended to build nuclear weapons; and that the regime's enthusiasm had waned after the US invasion of Iraq, which was sparked by a misguided hunt for atomic components and other so-called weapons of mass destruction. Throughout this year, as the White House has ramped up its rhetoric against Tehran, urging increasingly tougher UN sanctions and occasionally beating a war drum, the US's 16 intelligence collection and assessment agencies have been trying to verify what Ashgari told them. The spies had been burned before by a defector - scorched, in fact. And serving up false information a second time around could lead to an irretrievable loss of public confidence in their ability to do their job.
An Iraqi who came knocking in Germany with alleged details about former president Saddam Hussein's nuclear and chemical weapons programs was instrumental in shaping the Pentagon and CIA's case for invading Iraq in 2003. The man, dubbed by the Americans as "Curveball", had been a walk-in to the German spy agencies. He had sold them on one chilling word, biowaffen, German for biological weapon. Only after the Saddam regime had fallen and Iraq had descended into civil war were the Western world's spies able to establish that Curveball was far from being who he claimed.

The man who touted himself as a central figure to all of Saddam's wicked intent was a taxi driver, with no access to anything of the sort, even if it did exist. Much of what former secretary of state Colin Powell took to the UN Security Council as justification for the invasion, and of what former CIA chief George Tenet has described as a slam-dunk case, was based on the word of a fabulist. Curveball had damaged the Western spies like no other defector since the deepest, darkest days of the Cold War. And while there was no doubt about Ashgari's credentials, there was, for a while, a grave fear about his intentions. For several months, the CIA shared only scant details of what their prize had told them, even to close ally Israel, which, given the repeated direct challenges to its existence by Ahmadinejad, had more interest than anyone in finding out what he knew. He confirmed the regime had been building two nuclear plants in southern Iran, one in Arak and the other in Bushehr, and that both had been using centrifuges to enrich uranium. He also confirmed that both had at one stage been central to a broader goal of becoming the region's second nuclear state, after Israel. But that goal, he revealed, had been put on hold in late 2003, about six months after the US-led invasion of Iran's neighbour, Iraq. The Americans had demonstrated both their seriousness and intent when they rolled into Iraq and Iran had determined its ambitions could wait. After six months of cross-checking, then checking again, the once-burnt-twice-shy spies were ready to act on Ashgari's information. They were satisfied he was not an Iranian double-agent and that what he had told them was genuine. In August, director of US National Intelligence Mike McConnell made an appointment with President George W.Bush. He turned up with information that might have been difficult to digest for Bush, who at the time had committed his regime to an ever-increasing diplomatic siege and economic boycott of Iran and who pointedly held the threat of war over Ahmadinejad. McConnell outlined what was nothing less than an "about-face" from a national intelligence assessment two years earlier that had said "with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immoveable". The new estimate says the agencies "judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program ... (and) assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons". Asked last week why he had stepped up the rhetoric against Iran even after he had received the surprise assessment, Bush said the information had to be checked again. Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, it has been hard to gather intelligence there. Since 2001, most of the West's intelligence arms have been focused on the threat posed by radical Sunni Islam from the Arab world. The Western spooks have had little more than a toe-hold in Iran and the radically different culture and language there has made it difficult to reconfigure the apparatus and resources to zero in on a closed community of scientists and regime loyalists that has proved almost impossible to crack.
That double check came back with a confirmation in late November. It was quickly passed on to key allies, including the Israelis. Bush and key staff personally briefed Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defence Minister Ehud Barak when both were in Washington for the Middle East peace summit at the time. The Israelis left Washington unsatisfied and their displeasure was still apparent during the week when the intelligence assessment was publicly released. Immediately afterwards, senior ministers took to the airwaves to rebuke, albeit politely, the American conclusions. "The bottom line is that words don't stop missiles; actions do," Barak said in response to the report. In a tacit acknowledgement of Ashgari's role in the report's conclusions, Barak said much of the Western world's intelligence on Iran had been "coming from one track". "It's apparently true that in 2003 Iran stopped pursuing its military nuclear program for a time. But in our opinion, since then, it has apparently continued that program. There are differences in the assessments of different organisations in the world about this, and only time will tell who is right. We cannot allow ourselves to rest just because of an intelligence report from the other side of the earth, even if it is from our greatest friend." Israeli military officials who spoke anonymously to The Australian said: "No one can pretend that they have a lot of (intelligence) assets there. The difference between what we are doing and what the Americans, Germans and British are doing comes down to how we assess the information. It's not methodologies." Much of Israel's regional policy, defence spending, and even some domestic political platforms are focused towards Iran and the existential threat that many here feel the Islamic state poses. The Israeli airstrike against a suspected fledgling nuclear reactor in northern Syria in September sent an unambiguous message to Tehran, and the Israeli rhetoric ever since has removed any remaining doubt that the fighter jets would be sent in again - no matter the consequences. Much of the momentum that fell in behind the recent Annapolis peace summit, particularly the involvement of the Arab world, was due to a gathering bulwark against the perceived threat posed by Iran to the Sunni Arab world's interests. The fallout from the shift in position is yet to be felt across the Arab world, which had been becoming increasingly uneasy at an Iranian renaissance that many felt was taking on a revolutionary edge. By week's end, Barak had stated a new reality in the Middle East that has caught many here by surprise. When asked if the new intelligence assessment meant the chances of a pre-emptive attack against Iran had dropped, he said: "That's possible." Others in the Israeli administration were far more emphatic. "There's no way we'd do it alone," said one high-ranking official. "That's it. If the Iranians continue to down tools in their nuclear sites, there will not be a war."

And this is what the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC of IDIOTS apologist have to say about this subject


Is the Iran NIE a Trojan Horse? by Russ Wellen - December 9, 2007

The Iran NIE has elicited a range of emotions in those opposed to the Bush administration's policies from gloating to discreet celebration. In the minds of many, it's like V-Day: Let the church bells peal, kiss a girl in Times Square. Others, particularly Iranian commentators located in the US, are considerably less sanguine.
They fear, as Farideh Farhi writes at Juan Cole's spin-off, Informed Comment: Global Affairs, that the NIE can "easily become an instrument in support of the Bush Administration's current policy."In fact, according to Kaveh Afrasiabi at Asia Times Online, "The temporary freeze on the military option [resulting from] the new intelligence report has nested within it its exact opposite." In other words, a Trojan horse.Even though, he maintains, the nuclear programs that Iran halted in 2004-2005 were not weapons, the NIE and the administration painted them as such. If a follow-up report were to indicate that Iran planned to resurrect said weapons program, that would provide "ample justification for Washington's planned 'pre-emptive strikes' on Iran, not to mention added sanctions."Thus leaving "the pendulum capable of swinging in wildly different directions almost at will."Meanwhile, at CASMII (Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Action Against Iran), Daniel Pourkesali writes, "Forgive this writer for being a spoiler." But he too finds that the resurrection theme is like a ticking time bomb embedded in the NIE.He mentions the "assertions on page 7 paragraph D [of the NIE] that 'Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to produce nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so.'"They leave "the door wide open for administration hawks like Mr. Cheney to abruptly accuse Iran of resurrecting its 'nuclear weapons program much as he did back in 2002, claiming that Saddam Hussein had 'resumed his effort to acquire nuclear weapons.'" In other words, the hawks are fixated on another bird, the phoenix.At NIAC (National Iranian-American Council), Trita Parsi explains how the administration further unrolls the rock before the resurrection justification. "Rather than adjusting policy on Iran in accordance to the reality-check provided by the NIE, the President moved the goal post on Iran."As the NIE declared that Iran likely doesn't have a weapons program, the President shifted the red line from weaponization to the mere knowledge of enriching uranium [which, of course] is not of a military nature and is permitted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.""The President also pointed out, as though to justify military strikes, that Iran's knowledge of the enrichment process would permit Tehran to have a clandestine program. [But, of course] a full suspension of the Iranian program would not eliminate the Iranian knowledge of the enrichment program and, as a result, the risk of a clandestine program would continue to exist."Unless, of course, the atomic scientists of Iran submitted to the erasure of their memories as if their minds were hard drives.Finally, Ms. Farhi comments on the "propitious convergence between the NIE and the Bush Administration's current policy and the timing of the release of this report," which was finished a year ago. (See Gareth Porter for a full explanation.)First she reminds us of Stephen Hadley's statement that "the President has the right strategy, intensified international pressure along with the willingness to negotiate. . . [and for it] to succeed, the international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran –- with diplomatic isolation, United Nations Sanctions, and with other financial pressure."Then she frets that "this NIE can so easily become an instrument in support of the Bush Administration's current policy." We'll allow Dr. Afrasiabi to be the last to rain on the parade. "The bottom line. . . [is that the US] has now pre-positioned itself for yet another disastrous gambit in the volatile Middle East."




Details in Military Notes Led to Shift on Iran, U.S. Says
By DAVID E. SANGER and STEVEN LEE MYERS Of the NewYork Times: December 6, 2007

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 — American intelligence agencies reversed their view about the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons program after they obtained notes last summer from the deliberations of Iranian military officials involved in the weapons development program, senior intelligence and government officials said on Wednesday. The notes included conversations and deliberations in which some of the military officials complained bitterly about what they termed a decision by their superiors in late 2003 to shut down a complex engineering effort to design nuclear weapons, including a warhead that could fit atop Iranian missiles.

The newly obtained notes contradicted public assertions by American intelligence officials that the nuclear weapons design effort was still active. But according to the intelligence and government officials, they give no hint of why Iran’s leadership decided to halt the covert effort. Ultimately, the notes and deliberations were corroborated by other intelligence, the officials said, including intercepted conversations among Iranian officials, collected in recent months. It is not clear if those conversations involved the same officers and others whose deliberations were recounted in the notes, or if they included their superiors. The American officials who described the highly classified operation, which led to one of the biggest reversals in the history of American nuclear intelligence, declined to describe how the notes were obtained. But they said that the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies had organized a “red team” to determine if the new information might have been part of an elaborate disinformation campaign mounted by Iran to derail the effort to impose sanctions against it. In the end, American intelligence officials rejected that theory, though they were challenged to defend that conclusion in a meeting two weeks ago in the White House situation room, in which the notes and deliberations were described to the most senior members of President Bush’s national security team, including Vice President Dick Cheney. “It was a pretty vivid exchange,” said one participant in the conversation. The officials said they were confident that the notes confirmed the existence, up to 2003, of a weapons programs that American officials first learned about from a laptop computer, belonging to an Iranian engineer, that came into the hands of the C.I.A. in 2004. Ever since the major findings of the new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear program were made public on Monday, the White House has refused to discuss details of what President Bush, in a news conference on Tuesday, termed a “great discovery” that led to the reversal.Some of Mr. Bush’s critics have questioned why he did not adjust his rhetoric about Iran after the intelligence agencies began to question their earlier findings.In a statement late Wednesday, the White House revised its account of what Mr. Bush was told in August and acknowledged that Mike McConnell, the director of national intelligence, had informed him new information might show that “Iran does in fact have a covert weapons program, but it may be suspended.”Dana Perino, the White House press secretary, said Mr. McConnell had warned the president that “the new information might cause the intelligence community to change its assessment of Iran’s covert nuclear program, but the intelligence community was not prepared to draw any conclusions at that point in time, and it wouldn’t be right to speculate until they had time to examine and analyze the new data.” A senior intelligence official and a senior White House official said that Mr. McConnell had been cautious in his presentation to Mr. Bush in an attempt to avoid a mistake made in the months leading to the Iraq war, in which raw intelligence was shared with the White House before it had been tested and analyzed.“There was a big lesson learned in 2002,” the senior intelligence official said. “You can make enough mistakes in this business even if you don’t rush things.”In fact, some in the intelligence agencies appear to be not fully convinced that the notes of the deliberations indicated that all aspects of the weapons program had been shut down. The crucial judgments released on Monday said that while “we judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years,” it also included the warning that “intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate” led both the Department of Energy and the National Intelligence Council “to assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.”The account is the most detailed explanation provided by American officials about how they came to contradict an assertion, spelled out in a 2005 National Intelligence Estimate and repeated by Mr. Bush, that Iran had an active weapons program.Several news
organizations have reported that the reversal was prompted in part by intercepts of conversations involving Iranian officials. In an article published on Wednesday, The Los Angeles Times said another main ingredient in the reversal was what it called a journal from an Iranian source that documented decisions to shut down the nuclear program. The senior intelligence and government officials said a more precise description of that intelligence would be exchanges among members of a large group, one responsible for both designing weapons and integrating them into delivery vehicles.The discovery led officials to revisit intelligence mined in 2004 and 2005 from the laptop obtained from the Iranian engineer. The documents on that laptop described two programs, termed L-101 and L-102 by the Iranians, describing designs and computer simulations that appeared to be related to weapons work.Information from the laptop became one of the chief pieces of evidence cited in the 2005 intelligence estimate that concluded, “Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons.” The newly obtained notes of the deliberations did not precisely match up with the programs described in the laptop, according to officials who have examined both sets of data, but they said they were closely related.On Wednesday President Bush repeated his demand that Iran “come clean” and disclose details of the covert weapons program that American intelligence agencies said operated from the 1980s until the fall of 2003. Iran’s government, Mr. Bush said, “has more to explain about its nuclear intentions and past actions, especially the covert nuclear weapons program pursued until the fall of 2003, which the Iranian regime has yet to acknowledge.” Mr. Bush spoke at Eppley Airfield near Omaha, where a visit intended to showcase health care and to raise money for a Senate race was overshadowed by the furor caused by the National Intelligence Estimate and Iran’s taunting reaction to it. He faced calls from across the political spectrum for the United States to make a more concerted effort to negotiate with Iran, offering a package of incentives that could persuade it to suspend its uranium enrichment program and clear up concerns that it is building a civilian energy program to develop the expertise for a covert military program.“Bush has made a big mistake, and he’s not responding in a way that gives confidence that he’s on top of this,” said David Albright, a former weapons inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency and president of the Institute for Science and International Security. “He isn’t able to respond because he’s not able to say he’s wrong.” Mr. Bush, though, made it clear that there would be no immediate change in the United States’ approach, saying that the administration had already offered to talk, though on the condition that Iran suspend its current enrichment program first, as called for in two United Nations Security Council resolutions. Administration officials have said that they would continue to advocate tougher sanctions, which seems increasingly unlikely.

CIA has recruited Iranians to defect : By Greg Miller - Los Angeles Times Staff Writer - December 9, 2007

The secret campaign was launched two years ago to undermine Tehran's nuclear program. It has persuaded a 'handful' of key officials to leave.

The CIA launched a secret program in 2005 designed to degrade Iran's nuclear weapons program by persuading key officials to defect, an effort that has prompted a "handful" of significant departures, current and former U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the operation say.The previously undisclosed program, which CIA officials dubbed "the Brain Drain," is part of a major intelligence push against Iran ordered by the White House two years ago.Intelligence gathered as part of that campaign provided much of the basis for a U.S. report released last week that concluded the Islamic Republic had halted its nuclear weapons work in 2003. Officials declined to say how much of that intelligence could be attributed to the CIA program to recruit defectors.Although the CIA effort on defections has been aimed in part at gaining information about Tehran's nuclear capabilities, its goal has been to undermine Iran's emerging capabilities by plucking key scientists, military officers and other personnel from its nuclear roster.Encouraging scientists and military officers to defect has been a hallmark of CIA efforts against an array of targets since the height of the Cold War. But officials said those programs did not generally seek to degrade the target's capabilities, suggesting that U.S. officials believe Iran's nuclear know-how is still thin enough that it can be depleted.The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.The CIA effort reflects the urgency with which the U.S. government has sought to slow down Iran's nuclear advances, as well as the importance Washington attaches to finding human sources who can help fill intelligence gaps left by high-tech collection methods such as satellites and electronic eavesdropping equipment. The program was described by officials on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the effort.The White House ordered the stepped-up effort in hopes of gathering stronger evidence that Tehran was making progress toward building a nuclear bomb. The Bush administration "wanted better information" on Iran's nuclear programs, said a U.S. official briefed on the expanded collection efforts."I can't imagine that they would have ever guessed that the information they got would show that the program was shut down," the official said.That was the central finding of the comprehensive intelligence report released last week. The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran contradicted previous intelligence assessments and undercut assertions by the Bush administration.The new report, which represents the consensus view of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, also concluded that Tehran "at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" and continuing to pursue civilian nuclear energy technologies that could help it make a bomb.A CIA spokesman declined to comment on the effort to cultivate defectors, saying "the agency does not comment on these kinds of allegations as a matter of course."White House reversalThe administration's decision to step up intelligence collection on Iran in 2005 was a reversal from a position the White House took after President Bush was first elected. Former CIA officials said that the agency had built up a large Iran Task Force, made up of nearly 100 officers and analysts at headquarters, by the end of the Clinton administration. But that office shrank to fewer than a dozen officers early in the Bush administration, when the White House ordered resources shifted to other targets."When Bush came in, they were totally disinterested in Iran," said a former CIA official who held a senior position at the time. "It went from being a main focus to everything being switched to Iraq."Asked about decisions to reduce the size of the Iran Task Force, CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said: "Iran has been an issue of priority to the United States for a long time. You shouldn't assume that a single unit of any size reflects the complete level of effort. That would be a mistake."Even as the task force shrank, officials said, other CIA units, including its counter-proliferation division, continued to track Iran's procurement networks and other targets.Some of that reduced task force capacity has been restored, former CIA officials said. Two years ago, the agency created an Iran division within its overseas spying operations, applying to a single country resources and emphasis usually reserved for multinational regions.The stepped-up effort went beyond the CIA, and has also involved the National Security Agency, which eavesdrops on other countries' communications, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which operates spy satellites.The defector program was put in place under CIA Director Porter J. Goss, who has since left. The agency compiled a list of dozens of people to target as potential defectors based on a single criterion, according to a former official involved in the operation: "Who, if removed from the program, would have the biggest impact on slowing or stopping their progress?"The rewards for defectors can be substantial, including relocation to another country and lifetime financial support.In the two years since it was launched, the program has led to carefully orchestrated extractions of a small group of Iranian officials who operated in the mid- to upper tiers of the Islamic Republic's nuclear programs.None of those who defected was considered essential to the nuclear program, nor were they able to provide comprehensive descriptions of Iran's efforts, officials said."Did they have replacements for these people? Any country would have," the former official involved in the operation said. "But we did slow the program."The identities of the defectors have been carefully protected. However, there was speculation this year of CIA involvement in the apparent defection of a former Iranian deputy defense minister, Ali Reza Asgari, who went missing in February during a visit to Turkey.At the time, Iran's top police chief was quoted in the official news agency as saying that Asgari probably had been kidnapped by operatives working for Western intelligence services. Asgari was believed to have extensive knowledge of Iran's conventional weapons program as well as its ties to the militant Shiite Muslim group Hezbollah in Lebanon.But Asgari was not thought to be involved in Iran's nuclear program, and the CIA, when pressed by congressional officials about the matter, adamantly denied involvement in the Iranian general's disappearance.Officials declined to discuss the whereabouts of the defectors, or details regarding the methods used to approach them. The former senior U.S. intelligence official said that potential defectors had not been approached directly by the CIA, but through other contacts the agency has cultivated inside the country.Often, the former official said, there are as many as "three degrees of separation" between agency personnel and those targeted for approach, and that each of those interim contacts had to be thoroughly vetted before a planned approach was approved. Those who have left Iran have been debriefed and relocated either by the CIA or with the help of allied intelligence services, the former official said.The CIA program was implemented after significant debate between the White House and the agency over its size and scope, officials said. National Security Council officials urged the CIA to make the program as broad as possible, and to spread word through Iranian networks that the United States was prepared to help officials leave the country and relocate.But CIA officials fought to keep the program narrowly targeted to avoid catching the attention of Iran's intelligence service. Even at that, CIA officials assumed that Iran's service was keeping close watch on key officials in the nuclear program, and that potential defectors could be decoys.The "Brain Drain" program is among the latest in a long series of efforts to shore up U.S. intelligence on Iran. It was launched at a time when a presidential commission was preparing a scathing report on the inadequacies of U.S. intelligence on Iran and other nations suspected of having nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.U.S. intelligence officials said the information that surfaced this summer prompting the reevaluation of Tehran's nuclear weapons program centered on intercepts of Iranian government officials' conversations and the seizure of a journal that contained notes documenting the country's decision to shut down its weapons research.During a briefing with reporters last week, a senior U.S. intelligence official said that Iran was "the hardest intelligence target there is.""I mean, by comparison, North Korea is an open and transparent society," the official said.History of setbacksU.S. intelligence on Iran has been beset by setbacks stretching back more than two decades. The CIA has had no permanent presence in the country since the United States broke diplomatic ties with the country -- and removed embassy personnel, as well as CIA officials who operated under diplomatic cover -- after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.Afterward, the agency began recruiting sources in Europe and elsewhere, in cities where there are large populations of Iranian expatriates who travel to and from the country. But the effort has been marked by failures.In 1989, Iran's intelligence services broke up a network of agents in the country that was being directed by a CIA station in Germany known as "Tefran," for Tehran-Frankfurt. When that station was shut down, much of the collection work was shifted to Los Angeles, where there is a large population of Iranian immigrants, many of whom visit their home country.


Rough Estimates What US intel Missed in Iran Nukes
December 11, 2007 New York Post Amir Taheri

WHATEVER its merits in terms of reliable information on Iran's nuclear ambitions, the new US National Intelligence Estimate has something for everyone. President Bush can cite it in support of his contention that the Islamic Republic had been lying about its nuclear program for years and that at one point Iran had been engaged in building a bomb. And Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can use the new NIE in support of his no-compromise stance against the American "Great Satan." For more than two years, he has been telling Iranians to ignore American threats and UN Security Council resolutions and pursue the nuclear program as a national priority. The Democratic majority in Congress will find the NIE useful for its desire to tie Bush's hands as tightly as possible. The Europeans, along with the Russians and the Chinese, will use the new report to comfort themselves that they can stop worrying about the prospects of Khomeinism obtaining a nuclear arsenal. The NIE also offers the U.S. "intelligence community" a chance to improve its badly tarnished image. It received a lot of flak for having reported that Saddam Hussein was still busy building weapons of mass destruction in 2002. Having learned its lesson, the "community" now offers the kind of product that the market wants: a cocktail of ambiguity, wishful thinking and pious hope.
The new NIE is problematic on several accounts. To start with, its methodology remains a mystery. It seems to rely heavily on minutes of secret conversations between senior Iranian military leaders and their political bosses in Tehran. That, of course, opens the possibility of disinformation: Isn't it possible that the Khomeinist leadership in Tehran cooked up the whole thing to confuse its enemies? One possible source for those memoranda was a senior Iranian diplomat who, according to Ahmadinejad, contacted the British and provided them with "top-secret material" on Iran's nuclear program. But why would the diplomat do that - and why should that same diplomat be arrested and then quickly exonerated of all charges?
Alternately, what if Gen. Reza Asgari who defected to America - or, according to one version, was abducted by the Americans last year - was a mole sent by Tehran to provide Washington with false minutes of the supposed conversations?
The possibilities for political spin, not to mention concocting yarns of espionage, are simply endless. The estimate doesn't change the fact that Tehran has always claimed and continues to assert with great self-confidence that it never had a secret program. Thus, this is not a case like South Africa, Libya or North Korea - all of which admitted the existence of their respective nuclear programs before undertaking to scrap them. The NIE could do a great deal of harm in a number of ways. It may confirm the already widespread illusion that intelligence can be a substitute for policy. That would enable the political leadership to avoid even debating a credible policy on dealing with the Khomeinist regime. The NIE could shift, and to some extent has shifted, the focus of the debate from a possible threat from Iran to the time at which President Bush learned about the so-called "new facts." That, in turn, could add fuel to US self-flagellation while encouraging professional anti-Americans across the globe.
As I have written before, Tehran's policy has never been aimed at actually making a nuclear weapon. From the late '60s (even before the Khomeinists seized power) it has aimed at acquiring what's called a "nuclear surge capacity." This means having the knowledge, technological base, infrastructure and raw material needed to make nuclear weapons in a short time - without actually making the bomb. It's like someone who builds a kitchen and assembles the ingredients to make a soup at any moment - but decides not to do so for the time being. Acquiring "surge capacity" was a key part of the late shah's overall strategy and has remained a pillar of Iran's defense doctrine. The late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini stopped the nuclear program in 1979 along with many of the shah's projects - but it was restarted long ago by President Hashemi Rafsanjani and has been pursued with varying degrees of vigor by his two successors. How far has it gotten? As far as scientific knowledge and technological base are concerned, Iran has made great strides. It is also building the industrial structures needed through the centrifuge-making plants at Natanz and possibly Isfahan. For the needed raw materials, it is proceeding with its uranium-enrichment program. So, the kitchen is built and the ingredients for the soup fast assembled. But no one can come up with a lawyer-proof case that the Khomeinists are actually building a bomb. But when, and if, such a case becomes possible, it may be too late. This is the beauty of aiming at a "surge capacity." With the Americans settling scores with one another and the Europeans dancing around the issue, the Islamic Republic under its new radical leader is surging ahead to achieve the late shah's ambition. It's this fact that many might wish to ponder, not the Byzantine subtleties of an NIE crafted to please everyone. It's certainly foolish to cry wolf where none is around. But it could be suicidal to pretend there can be no wolf where one may come along.

سخنرانی احمدی نژاد در باره دانشگاه کلمبیا و جاسوس هسته ای

سخنان امامی کاشانی در نماز جمعه امروز تهران

سخنرانی امروز (چهارشنبه) احمدی نژاد در ایلام

US Defense Chief Still Considers Iran a Threat, Despite New Intelligence Estimate : Voice of America

Israelis Brief Top U.S. Official on Iran The New York Times
US armed forces chief in Israel for talks on Iran threat Mathaba.Net
There are no grounds for war with Iran USA Today
US, Iran to discuss Iraq on 18th Dawn
Morton Kondracke: NIE's upshot - War is out, but Iran is dangerous San Gabriel Valley Tribune, California

Draft targets Iran military, bank CNN
Iran bank on course for listing FT.com
Draft Sanctions Plan Targets Iran's Quds Force, Bank Melli Nasdaq
Iran Sanctions Would Punish Elite Force, Large Iranian Bank Nasdaq
Draft U.N. Sanctions Aimed at Iran San Francisco Chronicle
Iran stops selling oil in U.S. dollars -report Guerrilla News Network
Iran to start privatising state bank, says official The Peninsula
Draft Iran sanctions plan would punish elite military force and large bank KOLD-TV, Arizona

China: An Oil Deal With Iran The New York Times

China signs $2bn Iran oil deal Aljazeera.Net, Qatar


EDITORIAL: U.S. errs on Iran nukes Asahi Shimbun
Chabot: CIA's Iran reports unreliable Cincinnati Enquirer, Ohio
CIA launched defection programme for Iran PakTribune.Com
Ahmadinejad Calls Report a Victory for Iran The New York Times
Iran's nuclear programme The Irish Times
The myth of a bargain with Iran FT.com
Iran nuclear program boosted by AMD-based Linux supercomputer Microsoft's Channel 9

New U.N. Iran Resolution Considered The Washington Post
Bush Team Snubbed `Grand Bargain' on Iran Atomic Plans in... Bloomberg
Major powers to consult again Tuesday on Iran: Rice TurkishPress.com
"Cole in Salon: The GOP's Iran option is off the table Juan Cole (Weblog)
The GOP's Iran option is off the table Salon.com - Joe Conason 02:01
Group Joins Pushback on Iran The Wall Street Journal

Tuerie commanditée par l’Iran : Berlin libère un condamné L'Orient Le Jour

L’Irak plaide pour un pacte de sécurité régional incluant l’Iran L'Orient Le Jour
French tourist shot dead in Iran Dawn

Levinson May Be In Iraq; Release Will Be Announced After Summit

Levinson May Be In Iraq; Release Will Be Announced After Summit


Written by the National Security News Service
Tuesday, 01 May 2007
Usually reliable Iranian sources say that detained American, Robert Levinson, was turned over to American officials in the last 24-hours.
The Iranian source said that “He is no longer here. But because he was never ‘officially detained’ here, no one will say on the record that he has been released. I have again been told to be quiet and that he is definitely in the hands of his countrymen - perhaps in Iraq. This would have been a simple border exchange. I think he will be kept out of site until the summit next week. He will be kept under wraps until the US can figure out a way to reintroduce him. People here expect no credit to Iran for the release before the Sharm el-Sheikh summit. But I am satisfied he is out of this country.”
This information has not been confirmed by U.S. officials. “At this point we are aware of unconfirmed accounts in the media that he departed Iran,” according to State Department spokesman Karl Duckworth. “We are continuing to work with the Swiss to get information on his welfare and whereabouts,” Duckworth said.
FBI spokesman John Miller, when asked to comment on reports of Levinson’s release, told ABC News, "We are hearing the same thing, but we have no way to judge the credibility of that information."A high level intelligence source in the United States military in Iraq said "it is possible that Levinson has been turned over to Kurds in Iraq with an agreement that no public announcement be made until after a conference between the Iranian Foreign Minister and Secretary Rice next week in Egypt."
“This raises the possibility that the United States military may turnover up to five Iranian diplomats who we have been holding for months as a goodwill gesture as a response to Levinson’s release,” the US intelligence source said.
A Pentagon spokesman declined to comment.
Another source in Iran, who is familiar with the Levinson case said flatly: “Bobby Levinson is out of Iran perhaps he will reappear after the Sharm el-Sheikh meetings on May 3 and 4."

SLEEPING WITH THE ENAMY

U.S. Officer Accused of ‘Aiding Enemy’ in Iraq : By DAMIEN CAVE

BAGHDAD, April 26 — The American military has charged a top commander at its main detention center here with nine violations of military law, including “aiding the enemy,” a rare and serious accusation that could carry a death sentence. According to a military statement released Thursday, the officer, Lt. Col. William H. Steele, provided aid to the enemy between Oct. 1, 2005, and Oct. 31, 2006, “by providing an unmonitored cellular phone to detainees” at Camp Cropper, an expansive prison near Baghdad International Airport that held Saddam Hussein before he was hanged.

Colonel Steele, who oversaw one of several compounds at Camp Cropper as commander of the 451st Military Police Detachment, was also charged with several counts of illegally storing and marking classified information; failure to obey an order; possession of pornographic videos; dereliction of duty regarding government funds; and conduct unbecoming of an officer — for fraternizing with the daughter of a detainee since 2005, and for maintaining “an inappropriate relationship” with an interpreter in 2005 and 2006. There were no further details given to explain the circumstances of the accusations. Military officials said that Colonel Steele was detained last month and was now in Kuwait awaiting a military hearing to determine whether the case would proceed. They emphasized that he should be presumed innocent. “Is there enough evidence or information that this needs to go to a court-martial?” said Lt. Col. Josslyn L. Aberle, a military spokeswoman. “That’s where we’re at right now.” Walter Huffman, a former Army judge advocate general and now the dean of the Texas Tech University law school, said that a death sentence was unlikely, because to convict Colonel Steele of the most severe form of aiding the enemy, prosecutors would have to show that he intentionally endangered American troops or missions. In this particular case, he added, that would mean proving that he knew the cellphone was being used to make calls that would put Americans at risk. “That is a difficult charge to prove,” he said. Mr. Huffman, who emphasized that he had not seen the specific charges or details of Colonel Steele’s case, said the fraternization charge sounded as if it was not code for sex but rather a reference to the simple impropriety of regular contact with a detainee’s relative. That would take on added seriousness in a Muslim country, where speaking to young women outside of one’s family is considered highly inappropriate. He added that Colonel Steele’s rank and supervisory role at Camp Cropper magnified the seriousness of the allegations. “He’s the person in charge of enforcing the rules at the prison,” Mr. Huffman said. “It makes it an even more egregious offense because of the context.” Regardless of the outcome, the case amounts to another public relations bruise for the American detention system. Camp Cropper was meant to signify reform. It was expanded in recent years as a replacement for Abu Ghraib, where American jailers photographed themselves humiliating and torturing Iraqi prisoners, and it now holds about 3,000 people.
But it has had its share of problems. Several detainees there have died mysteriously in the past year, with the most recent death occurring April 4. The causes of death for these detainees are rarely divulged. The arrests and treatment of detainees at Camp Cropper is also the subject of a lawsuit filed in 2006 by an American security contractor who said he was unjustly held and mistreated at the prison after acting as an informant for the F.B.I. in cases involving corruption within the contracting company he worked for. A second plaintiff with a similar claim added his name to the complaint in February. Colonel Steele appears to be only the second American officer accused of collaborating with the enemy since the war in Iraq started four years ago.
In September 2003, Capt. James J. Yee, a Muslim chaplain at the Guantánamo detention center in Cuba, was accused of mutiny, sedition, aiding the enemy, adultery and possession of pornography. The military dropped all the criminal charges the following March, citing national security concerns that would arise from the release of evidence against him. A month later, Captain Yee’s record was wiped clean when an Army general dismissed his convictions for adultery and pornography. In Washington on Thursday, Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, told reporters that the violence of the war showed no signs of abating. North of Baghdad, two Iraqi women and two children were believed to have been killed in an American airstrike that killed four insurgents, according to a military statement. Soldiers were searching for car-bomb factories near Taji when they came under small-arms fire, the statement said. The soldiers called in an airstrike and later discovered all eight bodies at the destroyed building. Citing the weapons in the building, a military spokesman, Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, blamed Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia for the women’s and children’s deaths.
The police said a suicide car bomber exploded his vehicle south of Khalis, in Diyala Province, on Thursday, killing six Iraqi policemen. The police said that four bodies showing signs of torture were also found nearby in a grove of palm trees. In Baghdad, 26 bodies were found, a higher daily toll than in the first few weeks of the two-month-old security push, and roadside bombs, mortar attacks and car bombs across the capital killed at least 11 people and wounded scores more, according to an Interior Ministry official. In northern Iraq, two suicide bombers detonated their explosives at an office of the Kurdistan Democratic Party near Mosul, killing three people and wounding 13, according to the mayor of Tal Afar, a city about 30 miles to the south. The police also said gunmen in Tikrit had stormed the home of Hashim al-Majeed, a cousin of Saddam Hussein, and shot and killed his wife and daughter. Mr. Majeed, who disappeared soon after Mr. Hussein’s ouster in 2003, was not at home. Reporting was contributed by Abdul Razzaq al-Saiedi, Qais Mizher and Iraqi employees of The New York Times in Baghdad, and by Paul von Zielbauer and Michael Moss in New York.

Greedy Mr. Alavi , playing roulette and thinking of being 007 , pimping for the mullahs

FBI: Engineer Took Nuclear Plant Codes To Iran
April 21, 2007 The Associated Press CBS News
PHOENIX -- A former engineer at the nation's largest nuclear power plant has been charged with taking computer access codes and software to Iran and using it to download details of plant control rooms and reactors, authorities said.The FBI said there's no indication the plant employee training software had any terrorist connections.Mohammad Alavi, who worked at the triple-reactor Palo Verde power plant west of Phoenix, was arrested April 9 at Los Angeles International Airport when he arrived on a flight from Iran, authorities said.Alavi, 49, is a U.S. citizen and denies any wrongdoing, said his attorney, Milagros Cisneros of the Federal Defender's Office in Phoenix.He is charged with a single count of violating a trade embargo that prohibits Americans from exporting goods and services to Iran. If convicted, he would face up to 21 months in prison.According to court records, the software is used only for training plant employees, but allowed users access to details on the Palo Verde control rooms and the plant layout. In October, authorities alleged, the software was used to download training materials from Tehran, using a Palo Verde user identification.The FBI said there was no evidence to suggest the software access was linked to the Iranian government, which has clashed with the West over attempts to develop its own nuclear program."The investigation has not led us to believe this information was taken for the purpose of being used by a foreign government or terrorists to attack us," said Deborah McCarley, a spokeswoman for the FBI in Phoenix.Officials of Arizona Public Service Co., the Phoenix-based utility company that operates the Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, said the software does not pose a security risk because it doesn't control any of the nuclear plant's operating systems.However, the utility said it has changed software security procedures since Alavi quit in August after working there for 16 years.Palo Verde has been plagued by outages and equipment problems for the past several years.The plant, located about 50 miles west of downtown Phoenix, supplies electricity to some 4 million customers in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and California.

TIT FOR TAT, SPY CATCHERS AT WORK

U.S. Enlists Others to Help Find Ex-FBI Agent in Iran : April 18, 2007 , Reuters

The United States said on Wednesday it is asking other countries to help find out what may have happened to a former FBI agent missing in Iran. Florida resident Robert Levinson went missing while on a visit to the Gulf island of Kish in Iran early in March. U.S. officials have said they believe he is in Iran but have no credible information about his exact whereabouts. It is not clear why Levinson visited Iran. Diplomats fear the case of Levinson could mark a new twist in a series of detentions involving the United States, Britain and Iran, which began with the holding of five Iranians by U.S. forces in Iraq in January and the capture by Iran of 15 British sailors who were freed earlier this month. There are also heightened tensions over Iran's nuclear program, with Washington having spearheaded U.N. sanctions against Tehran. The U.S. State Department said it was approaching other nations, which it declined to name, because it had yet to get a satisfactory response to its own inquiry to Iran's government. "We are, starting today, going to approach other governments that have diplomatic relations with Iran to see if they know anything about Mr. Levinson's welfare and whereabouts and also to make inquiries on his behalf as well," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters. McCormack said the United States was asking others because Iran had enough time to investigate where Mr. Levinson might be but had not provided "any substantive information." "Perhaps there is information that they (other nations) might have. Perhaps they are able to find out information through their own resources on the ground there about Mr. Levinson's whereabouts," McCormack said. The United States first sought information about Levinson on March 12, making its request through Switzerland. When that inquiry proved fruitless, the United States sent a formal letter about two weeks ago, also via Switzerland. Details surrounding Levinson's visit to Kish island are sketchy, but the State Department has said the United States was "relatively confident" he did not leave Iran. The United States cut diplomatic ties with Iran in April 1980, five months after Iranian students occupied the American embassy in Tehran. Fifty-two Americans were held hostage for 444 days.

What a load of cock and bull !

Fugitive Says He Met Missing Ex-FBI Agent in Iran : April 13, 2007- The Financial Times Guy Dinmore in Washington and Najmeh Bozorgmehr in Tehran

An American fugitive living in Iran since he murdered an Iranian opposition activist in the US in 1980 has revealed that he met a former Federal Bureau of Investigation agent shortly before the latter disappeared on the Iranian island of Kish a month ago. US authorities have been anxiously seeking information about the former agent, Robert Levinson, for several weeks. The Iranian foreign ministry says it is trying to clarify his whereabouts. US officials suspect he is in Iranian detention. European diplomats in Washington hesitate to describe Mr Levinson as a "hostage", saying details of his case remain murky. They are concerned that the US, Britain and Iran are stumbling into a newphase of tit-for-tat prisoner-taking that was kicked off when the US detained five Iranian officials in Iraq in January, sparking anger in Tehran. The US State Department has revealed few details about Mr Levinson's visitto Iran, insisting he was there on purely privatebusiness. But Dawud Salahuddin, an American who converted to Islam and was given refuge in Iran in 1980, shed light on the mystery when he confirmed to the Financial Times in Tehran that he had met Mr Levinson in a hotel on Kish on March 8. Mr Salahuddin, known in Iran as Hassan Abdulrahman, said he was detained by officials in plain clothes at 11pm and taken from the room he shared with Mr Levinson to be questioned about his Iranian passport. Mr Salahuddin was freed the next afternoon and told by the officials that Mr Levinson had flown back to Dubai. "I don't think he is missing, but don't want to point my finger at anyone. Some people know exactly where he is," Mr Salahuddin said. "He came only to see me." According to Mr Salahuddin, the meeting was only to put Mr Levinson in touch with Iranian authorities to help his investigations on smuggling of cigarettes as part of the former agent's work for a tobacco company. "What he was trying to do in Kish was to find a channel to introduce him to authorities in Tehran to help find out about networks involved in smuggling of cigarettes, because his contractor company has been losing a lot of money." His account of their meeting confirmed the suspicions of friends of Mr Levinson in the US who believe he was arrested after meeting Mr Salahuddin. Mr Salahuddin has admitted in interviews to killing Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a former Iranian diplomat under the shah, in Maryland in 1980, shortly after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. In the past he has expressed an interest in returning to the US to face justice. He has also written about his long-distance relationship with another FBI agent, the late Carl Shoffler, who wanted to get him back to the US. US officials have stressed that Mr Levinson, whose expertise lies in Russian criminal gangs and counterfeiting, was not in Kish on US government business. Mr Salahuddin is worried about Mr Levinson's health but he is also confident "he is well taken care of" by Iranian authorities. He insisted Mr Levinson was innocent, blaming both Iranians for their "paranoia" about Americans and the US for its foreign policy which had made the former FBI agent "an innocent victim".

The apparent defection of an Iranian general takes a bizarre turn, writes philip jacobson

HOW MANY WIVES HAS HE GOT ?

In the arcane vocabulary of spycraft, the process of spiriting an agent out of hostile territory is known as an 'extraction'. Until yesterday, all the evidence in the mysterious case of Ali Reza Asghari - the senior Iranian general who disappeared from Tehran, turned up in Istanbul last month and then disappeared again - pointed to an intricately plotted extraction involving more than one intelligence agency.


Despite muted denials of involvement from Israel, the apparent defection of Asghari -a former deputy defence minister who served in the Revolutionary Guard and was instrumental in establishing Hezbollah in Lebanon - bore all the hallmarks of a coup orchestrated by the Israeli agency Mossad with the discreet co-operation of Turkish security agencies. According to knowledgeable Israeli sources, Mossad has maintained 'stay behind' Asghari’s wife appeared in public yesterday to echo the official line that he had been kidnapped intelligence assets in Iran since the Shah, a close ally of Israel, was overthrown almost 30 years ago (the Iranians claimed recently to have broken up a Zionist spy ring). Undercover Mossad agents have also operated successfully inside Syria, which may explain why Asghari made his way to Turkey via Damascus: flying directly to Istanbul, historically a crossroads of the espionage world (both Mossad and the CIA have long had a presence there) risked attracting the attention of Vavek, Iran's domestic security agency. Exactly what prompted Asghari to disappear in such haste is not clear: his abrupt removal from the defence ministry could be a factor. Another theory holds that he had been passing secrets to the West for several years and had recently become aware that Vavek was closing in: his distress signal activated a pre-prepared extraction plan.
Either way, the reception committee awaiting Asghari in Istanbul had booked him into a luxury hotel. But he never stayed the night. Instead, it appears that he quickly
Related links Will super-spy Eli Cohen rest in peace? Condi finally advocates diplomacy vanished into the shadows with a forged passport. Israeli sources say the Turks, anxious to preserve neighbourly relations with Iran, were guaranteed by Israel that he would swiftly be moved on elsewhere. Then yesterday, the sudden appearance in public of Asghari's wife, Ziba, (previous page) suggested this scenario may be wrong. Scotching rumours that she and the children had been spirited out of Tehran before Asghari himself vanished, she appeared outside the Turkish embassy in Tehran to echo the official line that her husband had been kidnapped by Israel on behalf of the US. So which is the truth? The extraction of an agent in trouble - or kidnap under duress? Although Western intelligence sources would rate Asghari as a 'high value' defector, his career path suggests that he is unlikely to have much to tell about Iran's nuclear programme. Any debriefing process would focus more closely on his inside knowledge of Hezbollah: the US is particularly eager for information that would link Iran definitively to the devastating truck bombings that the The US is eager to link Iran to the Hezbollah attacks on American targets in Beirut in 1983 organisation launched against a US Marines barracks and the American embassy in Beirut in 1983, which claimed more than 250 lives. Hard information about Iranian involvement in a mass murder that still angers America would be snapped up by the Bush administration as it contemplates an attack on Iran. Israeli interest would focus on finally establishing the fate of the air force officer Ron Arad, who was shot down over Lebanon in 1986. After falling into Hezbollah's hands, Arad was allegedly 'sold' to the Revolutionary Guard contingent in which Asghari served and was subsequently murdered. Israelis expect every effort to be made to rescue missing servicemen or to recover their remains. So, while both the US and Israel would be keen to talk history with Asghari, he is hardly a big enough fish for either country to risk a diplomatic fiasco over a kidnap attempt. Like many a story of espionage, there are more layers of the onion waiting to be peeled back before the unvarnished truth emerges.

Relatives of Missing Iranian General Accuse US of Kidnap / March 13, 2007 / The Guardian /Robert Tait in Tehran /
Claims by western intelligence to have scored a coup by securing the defection of a senior Iranian general were contradicted yesterday by the man's relatives, who claimed he had been kidnapped by US or Israeli agents. Relatives of Ali Reza Asgari, an Iranian former deputy defence minister who disappeared during a trip to Turkey, said reports that he had fled to the west were "lies". They said he would never have spied on Iran or abandoned his family. Their appearance, outside the Turkish embassy in Tehran, seemed to counter speculation that General Asgari had arranged for his family to move to the west. Media reports based on unnamed intelligence sources have suggested that he is cooperating with western agencies after escaping from Iran because he feared his cover as a mole was about to be blown.He was said to have fled to the Syrian capital, Damascus, and then to Istanbul after securing the escape of 10 relatives. However, Gen Asgari's wife, Ziba Ahmadi, emerged with his brother and three of his children to talk to reporters. They said all the general's close relatives remained in Iran. "We are here in Iran and have not gone anywhere," said Mrs Ahmadi. "These are enemies' rumours. My husband did not have any problems with Iran that would have led him to seek asylum. The person who wants to seek asylum first takes his family with him." Gen Asgari has two wives. However, his brother, Davoud, said: "His wives, children, father and brother are all in Iran." Mrs Ahmadi said Gen Asgari went missing on December 9, contradicting reports that he disappeared last month. His trip has been depicted as part of an elaborate escape operation. However, his wife said he went to attend to business interests. · Gen Asgari's relatives spoke after meeting Devrim Ozturk, Turkey's chargé d fer

Tracking the Enemy, Angleton on Ali Reza Asgari by Michael Ledeen .
“I mean, what difference does it make if he was snatched or if he defected? It’s the same guy, right?” The “he” was of course Ali Reza Asgari, the former Iranian deputy defense minister who disappeared from Istanbul in early February.JJA: Well, obviously it matters. If you’d ever developed a mind for counterintelligence you’d know right away. ML: You mean the possibility of disinformation, right? JJA: Well that’s one thing. If he just walked in, you’d have to wonder if he was a genuine defector or if the mullahs sent him to deceive us about something or other. On the other hand, if he’d been working with us for some time — I think it was the London Times that came up with this version — that might establish more confidence in his bona fides. ML: Or not... JJA: Right, or not, depending on whether the information he was providing was stuff we should have known about anyway, or whether it was really sensitive and new. And even then, you would have to have your doubts. [He always had his doubts, of course. You didn’t get to be the wizard of counterintelligence at CIA for a generation without having doubts. Lots of doubts.] ML: The newspaper accounts vary widely. The latest was an interview with his wife in Tehran, who said he was obviously kidnapped, that he had no possible motive to defect. JJA: Well of course she would say that, it’s what the regime has already said, and if they concluded he defected, she’s in big trouble now, since she doesn’t seem to have been aware of anything special and she didn’t warn anyone. ML: Yeah, fair enough. And she’s not the only one, is she? My pal Roger Simon, who writes stories and movies about plots like this, rightly says that the mullahs are undoubtedly looking for someone to take the rap for this. JJA: HoHO. Taking the rap is the least of the problems. He’s a big deal. A big fish, as the Iranians are saying. He could tell us a lot. ML: Right. But there’s something all these newspapers have missed. They forget he was Muslim. JJA: What is that supposed to mean? ML: He had several wives. Two for sure, and maybe three or four. An Iranian I trust said categorically that a wife and some children were flown from Istanbul to Tehran on the personal plane of the deputy defense minister. Maybe another wife disappeared along with him... JJA: Ah, that’s very interesting, if true. The folks arguing for defection said “his family” also disappeared. If that turns out to be wrong, it weakens the argument for defection. What else do you know? ML: I know a little about his work, and his movements. Several elements are very suggestive. First of all, despite the Iranian regime’s statements that he was “out of the loop,” he was very much at the center of it. As you know, he was one of the evil men who created Hezbollah... JJA: And how. A wicked genius of sorts. He was probably the guiding spirit behind the massacres of our Marines in Beirut in the early eighties. ML: Indeed. And he never stopped working with Hezbollah, he was a key intermediary to Mughniyah, the world’s most dangerous terrorist, and he organized the shipment of weapons from Syria to Iraq via Turkey. He’d been in Istanbul in January, I know that for sure. And I also know that our intel people were told about it at the time, by someone who told them that he was unhappy with his career and was a good recruitment target. JJA: Lots of smugglers in Turkey. Always have been. I remember during the Second World War... ML: That hotel he went to in Istanbul. You know, the one he went to after the Iranians had paid in cash for another one? Well the one he went to is the smugglers’ favorite spot, it’s where they went for business meetings. So he went there, left his bags — I’m going on newspaper reports here — walked out the door, and... JJA: And now he’s somewhere talking to someone. How unhappy was he? Unhappy enough to betray the Islamic Republic, which he had worked all his life to create? Unhappy enough to betray his comrades-in-arms, with whom he’d worked for so long? ML: Dunno. He’d been a real insider for many years, not just in the Defense Ministry, but he’d risen to become one of the Supreme Leader’s top advisers. He was in the kitchen cabinet, a very powerful position. But he was enraged when he didn’t get the top Defense job, he felt he’d been slighted. And then there are the legal questions. JJA: Yes, I’ve heard that myself. He was an inspector, and had identified corruption inside the ministry. As always happens, he was accused of corruption too, both financial and moral . ML: Moral? You mean sex? JJA: Sex. He liked the women. ML: Four wives weren’t enough? JJA: Hey, maybe it was only two, you said. ML: Even so, two wives, good grief... JJA: Anyway ... [and here I was starting to smell burning insulation from the Ouija board] ... anyway, he was brought before a judge and apparently got so angry he tried to beat up the magistrate. ML: You’re kidding. JJA: I don’t kid about things like this, you should know that ... [sparks came out of the Ouija board, and the burning smell was getting stronger]. ML: So he might have been afraid that his enemies were going to give him an all expenses paid vacation to Evin Prison. JJA: Certainly possible. But it’s not nearly enough to go on. We need more information... [My office now had a tiny cloud in it, and I was getting more static than Angleton. I got a few more fragments.] JJA: ...if kidnapped, most likely the Israelis, they have special teams...remember Eichmann?...but... ML: Yeah, the Israelis. But I don’t believe that London Times story about his working for them for 3-4 years. They wouldn’t have been so surprised at the Hezbollah structure in Lebanon last summer, would they? But he was gone. 'affaires in Tehran.

چهارشنبه، 23 اسفند ماه 1385 برابر با 2007 Wednesday 14 March
دست جمهوری اسلامی زیر ساطور سردار فراری سپاه
منصور امان
فرار یا دستگیری علیرضا عسگری، یک سرکرده بُلندپایه ی سپاه پاسداران، رژیم مُلاها را با بُحران جدیدی چه در روابط بین المللی خود و چه در پهنه ی داخلی، روبرو ساخته است. به موازات تقویت این احتمال که اطلاعات فرد یاد شُده به زودی علنی خواهد گردید، پایوران رژیم و دستگاههای امنیتی به فعالیتهای خود برای محدود کردن دامنه خسارت می افزایند.
تلاش ضد اطلاعاتی گُسترده ای که برای بی اهمیت جلوه دادن جایگاه پاسدار – سردار عسگری در ساختار نظامی و امنیتی حکومت صورت می گیرد، به گونه ناخواسته ای حساسیت رو به افزایش حکومت نسبت به این موضوع را تایید می کُند. در همین رابطه، وی که مُعاون وزیر دفاع در کابینه حُجت الاسلام خاتمی و سرکردگی سپاه قُدس در لُبنان را به عُهده داشته است، به عُنوان "کارمند بازنشسته" یا "تاجر روغن زیتون" مُعرفی می شود.
از سوی دیگر، مقامات جمهوری اسلامی کوشش می کُنند با بُزُرگ نمایی فرضیه ربودن آقای عسگری، شکاف عمیقی که در بالاترین رده های نظامی و امنیتی "نظام" به تماشا گُذاشته شُده است را بپوشانند. این امر به ویژه با توجه به تشنُج در مُناسبات خارجی رژیم و صف آرایی اقتصادی – نظامی در برابر آن، اقدامی در جهت حفظ انسجام درونی و جلوگیری از گُسترش آثار تحوُل اخیر بر لایه های بالایی "نظام" به شُمار می رود.
این در حالی است که به میان کشیدن پای سیا، موساد و - به تازگی - اینتلیجنت سرویس در این ماجرا، به نوبه خود می تواند ناتوانی حکومت در حفظ افراد کلیدی خویش را نیز اثبات کرده و بر بی اعتمادی رده های مزبور نسبت به استحکام چتر حفاظتی خود بیافزاید.
سُخنان "یک مقام آگاه" که خبرگُزاری حکومتی فارس آن را مُنتشر کرده است، نشان می دهد که جمهوری اسلامی همچنین به شدت نگران تاثیر افشای اطلاعات پاسدار – سردار عسگری بر پروسه بُحران هسته ای خود می باشد.
منبع مزبور در این رابطه به صراحت از تلاش آمریکا برای "تحت تاثیر قرار دادن شورای امنیت و کشورهای اروپایی" با استفاده از "این نمایش عملیات روانی" یاد کرده است.
آقای عسگری به ساطوری بدل گشته است که می تواند هر زمان بر دست رژیم - نه فقط - در لُبنان و عراق بلکه در اندرونی "نظام" نیز فرود آید.

دوشنبه، 21 اسفند ماه 1385 برابر با 2007 Monday 12 March

"خانواده" افسر پناهنده به سفارت تركيه در تهران رفتند
خبرگزاری حکومتی فارس: "خانواده عليرضا عسگري معاون وزير دفاع سابق جمهوری اسلامی پيش از ظهر امروز دوشنبه براي گفت‌وگو پيرامون وضعيت عسگري با رايزن و نفر دوم سفارت تركيه در تهران ديدار كردند. همسر، برادر و سه تن از فرزندان عليرضا عسگري پيش از ظهر امروز دوشنبه حدود يك ساعت در سفارت تركيه در تهران با رايزن و نفر دوم سفارت تركيه درتهران ملاقات و پيرامون وضعيت معاون وزير دفاع سابق گفت‌وگو كردند. زيبا احمدي همسر عسگري در اين باره گفت رايزن سفارت تركيه به ما قول داد كه با جديت به دنبال اين مسئله هستند."
جمهوری اسلامی با این صحنه سازی قصد دارد اینگونه وانمود کند که علیرضا عسگری در ترکیه "ربوده" شده و اخبار مربوط به پناهنده شدن او به غرب صحت ندارد، چرا که اگر قصد پناهنده شدن را داشت، همسر و فرزندان خود را نیز از ایران خارج می کرد. اما برخی منابع گفته اند این افسر بلندپایه سپاه پاسداران دارای دو همسر بوده است.

یکشنبه، 20 اسفند ماه 1385 برابر با 2007 Sunday 11 March

GET RID OF THEM ONE WAY OR OTHER

پزشکی فانونی دلیل مرگ دانشمند هسته ای رژیم را اعلام کرد

خبرگزاری حکومتی فارس: معاون سازمان پزشكي قانوني كشور مرگ دانشمند هسته ای بر اثر گازگرفتگي در شيراز را تأييد كرد.‌حسن عابدي گفت پس از مرگ اين دانشمند در خانه‌اش در شيراز جسد او براي شناسايي علت مرگش به پزشكي قانوني منتقل شد.وي افزود: بر روي جسد علايم مرگ بر اساس گازگرفتگي وجود داشت كه معاينات صورت گرفته بر روي جسد نيز آن را تأييد كرد.معاون پزشكي باليني سازمان پزشكي قانوني در خصوص علت حادثه نيز گفت: زمان حادثه اين دانشمند هسته ای در خانه‌اش تنها بود و نقص موجود در سيستم‌هاي حرارتي خانه علت آن بود.ساندي‌تايمز پيش از اين اعلام كرده بود: اردشير حسين‌پور، 44 ساله كه يك دانشمند هسته‌اي جمهوری اسلامی بود، توسط سرويس امنيتي اسرائيل، ترور شده است.

Defector Spied on Iran for Years

March 11, 2007 The Times Uzi Mahnaimi
An Iranian general who defected to the West last month had been spying on Iran since 2003 when he was recruited on an overseas business trip, according to Iranian sources. This weekend Brigadier General Ali Reza Asgari, 63, the former deputy defence minister, is understood to be undergoing debriefing at a Nato base in Germany after he escaped from Iran, followed by his family. A daring getaway via Damascus was organised by western intelligence agencies after it became clear that his cover was about to be blown. Iran’s notorious secret service, the Vavak, is believed to have suspected that he was a high-level mole. According to the Iranian sources, the escape took several months to arrange. At least 10 close members of his family had to flee the country. Asgari has two sons, a daughter and several grandchildren and it is believed that all, including his daughters-in-law, are now out of Iran. Their final destination is unknown. Asgari is said to have carried with him documents disclosing Iran’s links to terrorists in the Middle East. It is not thought that he had details of the country’s nuclear programme. An Israeli newspaper, Yedioth Aharonot, claimed this weekend that Mossad, Israel’s external security service, had orchestrated his defection. There is some evidence that the Mossad station in Istanbul was involved in shadowing Asgari after he arrived in Turkey via Damascus last month. It is unclear which intelligence organisation he was spying for. “He probably was working for Mossad but believed he was working for a European intelligence agency,” said an Israeli defence source. Asgari’s escape has provoked alarm in the Iranian regime. “Asgari is a gold mine for western intelligence,” said an Israeli defence source. “We have been following him for years, especially since the late 1980s when he was commander of the Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon.” In 1997 he was appointed deputy defence minister in charge of internal investigations. He uncovered several cases of embezzlement in the Republican Guard that made him unpopular. He was pushed aside after President Mahmoud Ahmadine-jad came to power in 2006. The two had been rivals for many years and Asgari realised that his days were numbered. During an overseas business trip in 2003 he is said to have met a new business partner, who turned out to be a foreign intelligence officer. “Ali Reza was a wealthy man even before 2003,” said an Iranian source. “Since 2003 he has become a very wealthy man.” On February 7, four days after arriving in Damascus and having been assured his family was safe, Asgari boarded a flight to Istanbul. He was given a new passport and left Turkey by car - to disappear into the shadows.

'General took vital papers from Iran'

Former Iranian General and assistant defense minister Ali Rez Asghari left Iran using a new passport and pseudonym and managed to smuggle important intelligence documents, according to a report published Friday morning by London-based newspaper Asharq Alawsat. According to the report, the missing Iranian general was carrying documents and maps of Iran's military and intelligence infrastructure as well as information regarding the relations between the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hizbullah and the Islamic Jihad. 'Iranian general may be key to Ron Arad' In addition, the general was reported to possess information regarding the Iranian nuclear program as well as information about Iran's strategic military plans. Meanwhile, Turkish newspapers reported that three Iranians disappeared in Turkey, following allegations that they attempted to smuggle missiles into Iran. Turkish newspapers reported Friday morning that the three Iranians, who owned Turkish companies operating, disappeared late last year following their attempts to smuggle spare used missile parts to Iran. Reportedly, the attempt to export American-made rocket pieces to Iran, was foiled when Turkish customs informed the US authorities of the sale. Turkish newspapers reported that the three Iranians disappeared shortly after the incident, last December.

SECRET NETWORK HELPED DEFECTOR By NILES LATHEM

March 9, 2007 -- WASHINGTON - A well-organized Iranian dissident group helped arrange the defection of Iran's former deputy defense minister in Turkey last month, and experts say more defectors are on the way as opposition to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad increases within Iran. The dissident group, which was not named for security reasons, helped in the planning of Gen. Ali Reza Asghari's Feb. 7 disappearance at a hotel in Istanbul days after his wife and other family members left Iran for a purported vacation, sources said. The group is currently negotiating with Western intelligence agencies from a hideout somewhere in Europe for a permanent place of exile, sources said. The United States and Israel, fingered by Iran's police chief as Asghari's kidnappers, have issued carefully worded denials that their governments were involved. Tehran regards Asghari's defection as a disaster. "This is just the tip of the iceberg," said Walid Phares, an expert in Iranian-backed Shiite terrorism. "Opposition to Ahmadinejad is growing inside Iran."

IRAN: 'BIG FISH' GONE MISSING By AMIR TAHERI

'A VERY big fish" - so Tehran sources describe former Deputy Defense Minister Ali-Reza Askari (sometimes called "Asghari" in the West), who disappeared in Istanbul on Sunday. Askari's disappearance fits an emerging pattern. Since December, the United States and its allies appear to have moved onto the offensive against the Islamic Republic's networks of influence in the Middle East:
* Jordan has seized 17 Iranian agents, accused of trying to smuggle arms to Hamas, and deported them quietly after routine debriefing.
* A number of Islamic Republic agents have been identified and deported in Pakistan and Tunisia.
* At least six other Iranian agents have been picked up in Gaza, where they were helping Hamas set up armament factories.
* In the past three months, some 30 senior Iranian officials, including at least two generals of Revolutionary Guards, have been captured in Iraq.
*All but five of the Islamic Republic agents seized in Iraq appear to have been released. One of those released was Hassan Abbasi, nicknamed "the Kissinger of Islam," who is believed to be President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strategic advisor.
*Among those still held by the Americans is one Muhammad Jaafari Sahraroudi, a senior Revolutionary Guard commander wanted by the Austrian police in connection with the murder of three Iranian Kurdish leaders in Vienna in 1989.

All this looks like a message to Tehran that its opponents may be moving on to the offensive in what looks like a revival of tactics used in the Cold War. But let us return to the "big fish."



A retired two-star general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, Askari had just led a military mission to Damascus, the Syrian capital. He was making a private "shopping stopover" in Turkey on his way back to Tehran. The Iranian mission's task was to lay the foundations for a Syrian armament industry, licensed to manufacture Iranian-designed weapons. The 30 or so experts that had accompanied Askari remained in Syria to work out the technical details.
According to some reports, Askari had stopped over in Istanbul to meet with an unidentified Syrian arms dealer who lives in Paris. Having at first denied reports of the general's disappearance, Tehran authorities eventually came out with a confirmation. The Islamic Republic's police chief, Gen. Ismail Ahmadi-Muqaddam, issued a statement Tuesday claiming that the missing general had been abducted by a Western intelligence service and taken to "a country in northern Europe."

Foreign Ministry sources in Tehran, however, said that Askari might have defected, possibly to the United States, where he has relatives. Some reports in the Iranian and Arab media suggest that the Israeli secret service Mossad and the CIA are behind Askari's disappearance. Israel has denied involvement in the general's disappearance, but The London Daily Telegraph speculated on Monday that Askari could have been abducted by Israel to shed light on the whereabouts of Israel Air Force Lt.-Col. Ron Arad, missing since 1986, who might have been held at one point by Iran. Askari was involved in a deal to transfer Arad to Tehran after his capture by the Lebanese Hezbollah. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was quoted Monday as saying Iran was "taking necessary steps" to solve the case: "A director-general from the [foreign] ministry has traveled to Turkey . . . We have asked Turkey to investigate Askari's case." According to Iranian sources, Askari, in his late 50s, joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRG) at its very start in 1979. He was an associate of Mostafa Chamran, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Iranian origin who returned to Iran when the mullahs seized power in 1979 and helped found the IRG. When Chamran was appointed defense minister two years later, Askari became one of his advisers. Always in the shadows, Askari was in charge of a program to train foreign Islamist militants as part of Tehran's strategy of "exporting" the Khomeinist revolution.
In 1982-83, Askari (along with Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Mohatashami-Pour) founded the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah and helped set up its first military units. The two men supervised the 1983 suicide attacks on the U.S. Embassy and on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut - killing more than 300 Americans, including 241 Marines. Iranian sources say Askari was part of a triumvirate of Revolutionary Guard officers that controlled Hezbollah's armed units until the end of the '90s. Askari led the 500-man Iranian military mission in Beirut from 1998 to 2000 before returning home to work for the Strategic Defense Procurement Committee. In that capacity, he often traveled abroad to negotiate arms deals. Tehran sources claim that Askari was also involved in Iran's controversial nuclear program, which, although presented as a civilian project, is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. They also say that last November he was appointed a member of the Strategic Defense Planning Commission set up by Ali Khamenei, the "Supreme Guide." Indeed, Iran is rife with rumors about the case: Askari has been transferred to Romania, where he is being debriefed by the Americans; he had documents with him, mostly related to Iran's military purchases abroad; Israeli efforts to see him (in connection with his years of running Hezballah) have so far failed to meet with success . . . Whether he defected or was abducted, Askari is a big catch with a mine of information about the activities of the Revolutionary Guard and its elite arm, the Quds Corps, which controls Arab and Turkish radical groups financed by Tehran. Last month, the United States accused the Quds Corps of supplying special projectiles to terrorists in Iraq to kill GIs.