Intelligence Brief: Iran's Covert Operations in Iraq

In recent weeks, Washington has intensified its accusations that Iran is involved in the insurgency in Iraq. It has claimed that Iran has funneled weapons to Iraqi insurgents, and that Iranian Revolutionary Guards soldiers are present in the country. Tehran has denied the accusations, with one Iranian cleric dismissing them as "a lie." The Bush administration's statements toward Iran have also caused an uproar in Washington, with politicians from both political parties accusing the administration of using faulty intelligence in the case of Iran, comparing the administration's claims with its statements made to justify the war in Iraq in 2003.
Regardless of the claims and counter-claims, it is highly likely that the Bush administration's allegations toward Iran are true, and that Iran's military and intelligence services are playing a significant role in Iraq.Iran's involvement in Iraq makes sense both from security and geopolitical standpoints. Iraq, which shares a long border with Iran, is in a state of relative anarchy. From a security standpoint, in order to prevent instability from spreading east into Iran, Tehran is attempting to monitor and condition developments so that they do not become dangerous to Iran's internal stability. With a civil war raging, various Iraqi insurgent groups are becoming more skilled in urban guerrilla warfare, and Iran aims to prevent any of these groups from eventually spreading violence into Iran.Furthermore, much of Iraq is hostile to Iran. Sunni Arabs, the former powerbrokers in the country, are hostile to Iran's Shi'a and Persian population, antagonism that has endured since the 1980-1988 war between the two countries. There is also the element of radical Salafi fighters in Iraq -- both domestic and foreign -- who see the Shi'a as heretics and consider it an obligation to kill them. Therefore, Iran's involvement aims to prevent developments in Iraq from having a negative impact on Iran's stability.Geopolitically, Iran's involvement in Iraq is necessary in order to ensure that the new government in Baghdad is friendly to Iran's interests. All states, when facing a neighbor that is experiencing political upheaval, will attempt to shape developments in that state to its interests if it has the power to do so. Iran is no different. As part of this policy, Iran is likely supporting the various friendly Shi'a groups in Iraq. Most Iraqi Shi'a factions -- such as S.C.I.R.I. and Moqtada al-Sadr's group -- are probably accepting assistance from Iran since, even if they wish to remain independent of Tehran, are willing to accept assistance at least until they gain power. Other Shi'a groups -- such as S.C.I.R.I., which runs the Badr Corps/Brigade -- spent years in exile in Iran when Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist establishment was in power. Iran's goal is to have one of these actors take and maintain power in Iraq, so that it can eliminate what has traditionally been a hostile Sunni Arab state.For Iran, effecting an outcome in Iraq that will secure its influence is crucial. If, for example, Iraq's Shi'a fail to secure power, and a Sunni Arab government takes control again, that government will likely be hostile to Iran's regional ambitions. Or, if a coalition government in Iraq forms that is friendly to the United States and allows Washington to maintain airbases in the country (which was one of the original end objectives of the Bush administration in 2003), Iran would remain concerned about the potential of the United States to limit Tehran's ability to pursue its regional interests. Indeed, by deepening its relationship with Iraqi powerbrokers, Iran also achieves negotiating leverage when dealing with the United States.These two factors -- security and geopolitical interests -- explain why it would be surprising if Iran were not playing a significant role in Iraq. It is in Tehran's interests to do so, and the failure to effect a political outcome in Iraq that would be beneficial to Iran would be a foreign policy blunder, especially since developments on the ground appear to be moving in Iran's favor, barring a debilitating attack on Iran from the United States. While it is possible that such an attack may take place against Iran, it does not appear that this course of action would be in the United States' best interests due to the many negative repercussions that would likely occur. [See: "Intelligence Brief: U.S. Moves to Regain Leverage over Iran"]Without such an attack, and with an eventual U.S. withdrawal likely, Washington will need to improve its relations with friendly powers and factions in the region, and maintain its presence in the Persian Gulf, in order to create a strategy that will contain Iran from reaching regional power goals that go beyond its immediate security and geopolitical interests concerning Iraq, such as bidding for hegemony in the Persian Gulf.