Alliance For democracy In Iran
Please have a look at my other weblog, Iran Democracy - http://irandemocray.blogspot.com/
IMPERIAL EMBLEM
PERSIA
Shahanshah Aryameher
S U N OF P E R S I A
Iranian Freedom Fighters UNITE
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
America has reverse itself
America has reverse itself unexpectedly and has trap Islamic Republic of Iran in a difficult and painful position
George Friedman in his article of January 17, 2007 in the Stratfor magazine titled Rhetoric and Reality: The View from Iran states that:
The Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.
I don't entirely believe that this is all the truth and so here is my opinion.
I suggest that the US has turn the table on the IRI strategy by imposing something on the Ground in IRAQ that the IRI could not handle and is now in retreat. The IRI have lost the battle of wills and the US might is becoming RIGHT. The way I look at it is this:
I agree that the Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran and that for the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities.
For Iran, on the other hand, I believe that their HOPE and their GOAL has always been the creation of a strong pro-Iranian SHIA government in Baghdad.
The Americans turned the table on IRI when they threatened to break up the country into there parts and when they allowed the Religious sectarian deference's to take hold of the body politics of IRAQ by not helping and/or imposing a democratic secular government with no ties to any religious party to take over the running of the ARMY, The POLICE and the GOVERNMENT, they have tacitly approved and allowed the Religious factions into the seat of the IRAQI power and its government. in other words, They have not clamped down on the Religious extremist on purpose and allowed them to flourish.
The result has been that the US has managed to portray and blame the IRAQI problem as a problem between the SHIA'S and the SUNNI'S, with the possibility of a total war between the majority Arab sunni's of the Islamic world against the Shia's of the IRI. This strategy has enabled the Western powers to be able to now help and support the Arab Sunni's majority to stand up to the minority Shia's of IRI and to curtail IRI's influence and power in the region.
I totally agree with Freidman that:
In the past, the Iranians have tried to be clever with great powers and, rather than trapping them, have wound up being trapped themselves. Sometimes they have simply missed other dimensions of the situation. For example, when the revolutionaries overthrew the Shah and created the Islamic Republic, the Iranians focused on the threat from the Americans, and another threat from the Soviets and their covert allies in Iran. But they took their eyes off Iraq -- and that miscalculation not only cost them huge casualties and a decade of economic decay, but broke the self-confidence of the Iranian regime.
The Iranians also have miscalculated on the United States. When the Islamic Revolution occurred, the governing assumption -- not only in Iran but also in many parts of the world, including the United States -- was that the United States was a declining power. It had, after all, been defeated in Vietnam and was experiencing declining U.S. military power and severe economic problems. But the Iranians massively miscalculated with regard to the U.S. position: In the end, the United States surged and it was the Soviets who collapsed.
The Iranians do not have a sterling record in managing great powers, and especially in predicting the behaviour of the United States. In large and small ways, they have miscalculated on what the United States would do and how it would do it. Therefore, like the Americans, the Iranians are deeply divided. There are those who regard the United States as a bumbling fool, all set to fail in Iraq. There are others who remember equally confident forecasts about other American disasters, and who see the United States as ruthless, cunning and utterly dangerous. These sentiments, then, divide into two policy factions. On the one side, there are those who see Bush's surge strategy as an empty bluff. They point out that there is no surge, only a gradual build-up of troops, and that the number of troops being added is insignificant. They point to political divisions in Washington and argue that the time is ripe for Iran to go for it all. They want to force a civil war in Iraq, to at least dominate the southern region and take advantage of American weakness to project power in the Persian Gulf. The other side wonders whether the Americans are as weak as they appear, and also argues that exploiting a success in Iraq would be more dangerous and difficult than it appears.
The United States has substantial forces in Iraq, and the response to Shiite uprisings along the western shore of the Persian Gulf would be difficult to predict. The response to any probe into Saudi Arabia certainly would be violent. We are not referring here to ideological factions, nor to radicals and moderates. Rather, these are two competing visions of the United States. One side wants to exploit American weakness; the other side argues that experience shows that American weakness can reverse itself unexpectedly and trap Iran in a difficult and painful position. It is not a debate about ends or internal dissatisfaction with the regime. Rather, it is a contest between audacity and caution.
If I was to believe that the Fear and uncertainty are the foundations of international agreement, while hope and confidence fuel war, then I would have to say that:
In the end, rather than a fractured Iraq -- an entity incapable of harming Iran, we would need a strong secular and democratic Iraq that would providing an effective buffer between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula and THAT is what is emerging as the most viable available option and that the Americans know this and have been working hard to achieve it.
http://www.myspace.com/fereydonabdollahyan and at http://www.livevideo.com/Ferey
George Friedman in his article of January 17, 2007 in the Stratfor magazine titled Rhetoric and Reality: The View from Iran states that:
The Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.
I don't entirely believe that this is all the truth and so here is my opinion.
I suggest that the US has turn the table on the IRI strategy by imposing something on the Ground in IRAQ that the IRI could not handle and is now in retreat. The IRI have lost the battle of wills and the US might is becoming RIGHT. The way I look at it is this:
I agree that the Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran and that for the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities.
For Iran, on the other hand, I believe that their HOPE and their GOAL has always been the creation of a strong pro-Iranian SHIA government in Baghdad.
The Americans turned the table on IRI when they threatened to break up the country into there parts and when they allowed the Religious sectarian deference's to take hold of the body politics of IRAQ by not helping and/or imposing a democratic secular government with no ties to any religious party to take over the running of the ARMY, The POLICE and the GOVERNMENT, they have tacitly approved and allowed the Religious factions into the seat of the IRAQI power and its government. in other words, They have not clamped down on the Religious extremist on purpose and allowed them to flourish.
The result has been that the US has managed to portray and blame the IRAQI problem as a problem between the SHIA'S and the SUNNI'S, with the possibility of a total war between the majority Arab sunni's of the Islamic world against the Shia's of the IRI. This strategy has enabled the Western powers to be able to now help and support the Arab Sunni's majority to stand up to the minority Shia's of IRI and to curtail IRI's influence and power in the region.
I totally agree with Freidman that:
In the past, the Iranians have tried to be clever with great powers and, rather than trapping them, have wound up being trapped themselves. Sometimes they have simply missed other dimensions of the situation. For example, when the revolutionaries overthrew the Shah and created the Islamic Republic, the Iranians focused on the threat from the Americans, and another threat from the Soviets and their covert allies in Iran. But they took their eyes off Iraq -- and that miscalculation not only cost them huge casualties and a decade of economic decay, but broke the self-confidence of the Iranian regime.
The Iranians also have miscalculated on the United States. When the Islamic Revolution occurred, the governing assumption -- not only in Iran but also in many parts of the world, including the United States -- was that the United States was a declining power. It had, after all, been defeated in Vietnam and was experiencing declining U.S. military power and severe economic problems. But the Iranians massively miscalculated with regard to the U.S. position: In the end, the United States surged and it was the Soviets who collapsed.
The Iranians do not have a sterling record in managing great powers, and especially in predicting the behaviour of the United States. In large and small ways, they have miscalculated on what the United States would do and how it would do it. Therefore, like the Americans, the Iranians are deeply divided. There are those who regard the United States as a bumbling fool, all set to fail in Iraq. There are others who remember equally confident forecasts about other American disasters, and who see the United States as ruthless, cunning and utterly dangerous. These sentiments, then, divide into two policy factions. On the one side, there are those who see Bush's surge strategy as an empty bluff. They point out that there is no surge, only a gradual build-up of troops, and that the number of troops being added is insignificant. They point to political divisions in Washington and argue that the time is ripe for Iran to go for it all. They want to force a civil war in Iraq, to at least dominate the southern region and take advantage of American weakness to project power in the Persian Gulf. The other side wonders whether the Americans are as weak as they appear, and also argues that exploiting a success in Iraq would be more dangerous and difficult than it appears.
The United States has substantial forces in Iraq, and the response to Shiite uprisings along the western shore of the Persian Gulf would be difficult to predict. The response to any probe into Saudi Arabia certainly would be violent. We are not referring here to ideological factions, nor to radicals and moderates. Rather, these are two competing visions of the United States. One side wants to exploit American weakness; the other side argues that experience shows that American weakness can reverse itself unexpectedly and trap Iran in a difficult and painful position. It is not a debate about ends or internal dissatisfaction with the regime. Rather, it is a contest between audacity and caution.
If I was to believe that the Fear and uncertainty are the foundations of international agreement, while hope and confidence fuel war, then I would have to say that:
In the end, rather than a fractured Iraq -- an entity incapable of harming Iran, we would need a strong secular and democratic Iraq that would providing an effective buffer between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula and THAT is what is emerging as the most viable available option and that the Americans know this and have been working hard to achieve it.
http://www.myspace.com/fereydonabdollahyan and at http://www.livevideo.com/Ferey
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)

No comments:
Post a Comment