Iran on the Brink: What's it like waiting around to be bombed?BY RUSS WELLEN

A recent CBS News/New York Times poll showed that 65 percent of Americans endorsed diplomacy with Iran, while 10 percent favored military action. But when asked by an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll if the US should "destroy Iran's ability to construct nuclear weapons," the percentage that advocated an attack rose to 43 with 47 percent demurring.
The same poll also asked if we should attack Iran if it were found responsible for exporting roadside-bomb technology to Iraq. Those in favor were now in the majority -- 55 percent -- while 45 percent opposed. The degree to which our opinions are manipulated by the introduction of mounting threats to the equation, as if from a dropper into an experiment, suggests we're unacquainted with the issue. But opinion polls are predicated on the assumption that the public is informed. However, as Christopher Shea once observed in a Salon article on the effects of voter ignorance: "Most people base their votes, and their answers to polls, on only the vaguest feelings about how the economy, or life, is treating them." Ideally, the polls would have prefaced the above questions with another: "Are you aware that the US is considering a military strike on Iran?" To many respondents, it might have been news. Unless you work in a foreign-policy think tank, the subject probably doesn't come up much, if at all. Meanwhile, those aware of it are likely to comfort themselves with the thought: "We'd never do that. We're already over-extended in Iraq." Americans have enough trouble dealing with -- or, as the case may be, screening out --- one war. We push the mute button on the drumbeat of war at our own peril. But it's even more dangerous when those in harm's way are in denial. It turns out that much of the Iranian public is tuning out the threat of an attack, too. In his Salon article "The view from Tehran," Hooman Majd writes that, "by and large [Iranian officials, as well as the public] do not believe that the United States will attack Iran, mostly because they cannot envision that the White House could be. . . so foolish as to attack a country where 10-year-olds have been willing to strap grenades to their waists and run under enemy tanks [as in the Iran-Iraq war]." They believe American saber rattling and deployment of aircraft carrier groups to the Persian Gulf are a "psychological war to frighten Iran." Recently on Foreign Policy in Focus, Farideh Farhi wrote a piece about Iran's political environment, in which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the ruling mullahs are often at odds. Its "highly contentious and fractured" nature is actually a "source of strength [emphasis added]," she reports, "rather than weakness, allowing for a wide range of input in the decision-making process." In other words, Iran already has the democracy drawn up for them by the Neocons. Furthermore, writes Farhi, Ahmadinejad's opponents "have shown no hesitation at all in closing ranks behind the hard-line position if they perceive the Islamic Republic or its vital interests to be at stake." Since Ms. Farhi's conversance with Iran is partly a result of living and working there for a time, we asked her if she thought Iranians were in denial. Bear in mind that, unlike the US, Iran (not to mention, much of the world) doesn't base all its decisions on polls and focus groups. Ms. Farhi writes: "Given lack of polling on this issue, it is difficult to gauge exactly what the Iranian public thinks. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that after a short period of concern, which came about when there was almost daily talk of attack on Iran in the European and American press, the Iranian public doesn't think much about the issue. "Iranian New Year [Nowrooz, March 21] is [upon them]. . . and basically thinking about what may be an impending war is not a nice way of living. So my bet is that most of the Iranian public is ignoring the issue not necessarily because there is denial but out of the necessities of everyday life. "What is significant, however, is that Majd is correct and much of the political class, particularly those with a conservative bent, thinks that only extreme irrationality would make US attack Iran. Ahmadinejad has even said in an interview that the US would not be so stupid. "The Iranian military brass and hard-line newspapers have also talked about the assessment that most of what is going on is psychological war. I am aware of only one official that has [publicly] entertained the possibility of attack. In a long interview with the Iranian television, Mohsen Rezaee, the secretary of Iran's Expediency Council, said that George Bush is a singularly determined man and if he decided to attack Iran, he will do it no matter what the obstacles are." We also asked M.K. Bhadrakumar, the former Indian ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey who writes for Asia Times Online on Iran and other issues, to weigh in. "I find myself in agreement with the assessment that the Iranian public doesn't take seriously an American military attack as a possibility. (No one with a logical fame of mind would, either.)" After that zinger at the Bush administration's expense, Mr. Bhadrakumar describes what will happen in the event of an attack. "Indeed, if the Bush administration does finally decide to do something as unwise as to strike Iran militarily, Iranian nationalism will overflow." He explains that the "Iranian revolution's strong social base (the further one moves away from Tehran's middle class, the more palpable it appears to a traveler) hasn't withered away. . . . It can be invoked by the leadership at short notice with devastating effect." In fact, he adds, the conceit that the regime has no public support is a "completely myopic idea." Consistent with Ms. Farhi's view that the combative nature of Tehran's internal politics is an asset, he believes that, "Iran's vibrant political life, and the garrulous nature of the Persians are not being taken into account by those outsiders making facile judgements such as that the regime is divided and is alienated from the public." Finally, he cautions the administration that it's "dangerous to take one's own propaganda seriously." As Mohsen Rezaee, the Iranian official Ms. Farhi quoted earlier, affirmed, the Iranian government "is prepared for the kind of attacks the US is entertaining." Still, it seems to us that a slumbering Iranian public, wakened with a start, might lend an American attack an element of surprise that by all rights it doesn't deserve since it's been "on the table" for years. Thus wounded, like the US after Pearl Harbor and 9/11, it might rally round the flag that much more quickly than if it had been living in dread for years. In the meantime, it might help our perspective to imagine what aircraft carrier groups massed outside your country feels like. Since the executive branch and the ruling mullahs are married to uranium enrichment, it's too late for Iranians to call their majlis (parliament) representatives and ask them to vote against it. In the same situation, we too might yield to the temptation to shield our eyes from the winds of war whipping up around us.

The view from Tehran : Iranians are fed up with the high price of tomatoes and their provocative president. But it would be dangerous for Bush and the West to overlook their national pride. By Hooman Majd

Feb. 21, 2007 At the local greengrocer on the corner of Hedayat and Safi Alishah, in the decidedly unchic downtown section of Tehran where I'm staying, the fruits and vegetables are stacked high in perfectly formed pyramids. A dilapidated pickup truck parked in front and loaded with fruit stacked in boxes serves as a billboard for passing motorists as well as extra square footage for the store. Oranges are most visible, a plentiful and cheap winter fruit, but tomatoes, a virtual staple in Persian cooking, are practically out of sight. Tomatoes, it seems, have become a valuable commodity in Iran these days, much to the dismay of everyone, including those in the corridors of power, for whom a kebab, salad or stew without tomatoes is an affront to the palate. I was born in Tehran and speak fluent Farsi, though I largely grew up in Europe and the United States. I have been traveling to Iran over the past three years, returning again in mid-January for six weeks to continue researching a book I'm writing on Iran and Iranians. Much has been made in the media of growing discontent inside Iran with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and in Tehran sentiments are indeed openly expressed against him and his administration in many quarters, including some of his own. It may be tempting, therefore, to imagine that the "Iranian people," those to whom President Bush often refers as aspiring to the very same thing we do, i.e., "freedom," are becoming as dissatisfied with their political system as they are with their president. However, it would be dangerous -- and all the more so if the imagining is done by the White House -- to make such a presumption. Iran's rather unique notion of democracy may not jibe with Western notions, but there are remarkable similarities that are often overlooked by analysts sitting at their desks a few thousand miles away. Iranians, like Americans, vote for their president and fully expect him, perhaps as naively as we do, to deliver on his campaign promises. As Bill Clinton's campaign slogan once went -- "It's the economy, stupid" -- so it goes in Iran. Foreign policy -- what we are most concerned with when it comes to Iran and its unusual leader -- is relevant to the Iranian masses only inasmuch as it affects their pocketbooks and, of course, their broader sense of security. And in Iran the economy is reeling. Bread and dairy prices are fixed by the government, but fruit prices are not, and as inflation has been particularly bad recently, Iranians have focused on tomatoes, found in practically every Iranian dish. Food price increases and astronomical home prices are making it difficult for the already squeezed working classes -- who were promised a share of Iranian oil wealth by Ahmadinejad -- to make a living. The unemployment rate, officially put at around 12 percent, is in reality 20 percent, or even higher, according to experts.
Every day when I try to hail a cab on Tehran's streets, private cars stop and offer me and others standing nearby a cheap ride. The drivers do not fit the profile of gypsy cab operators in cities such as New York; they are in many cases college graduates for whom there simply is no other work. Recently, I asked one licensed cabbie if he resented the competition, and he merely shrugged. "Why should I?" he asked. "Everybody's suffering, and if they could find better work they wouldn't be doing this." The blame for the economic woes of ordinary Iranians is laid squarely at the feet of the government -- and to Iranians that government is President Ahmadinejad. As for security, the massive buildup of U.S. naval forces in the Gulf has not gone unnoticed by the Iranian masses, who need only pause by a newsstand for a few moments a day and read the headlines of some 40 dailies neatly laid out on the sidewalk. Ahmadinejad's promises (both prior to and during his presidency) to alleviate Iran's economic woes have fallen short, and the style (but not necessarily the substance) of his foreign policy is widely viewed as having exacerbated the economic crunch and contributed to the sense of insecurity.
The United Nations Security Council resolution of December 2006 imposing sanctions on Iran for its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment is viewed here as an Iranian foreign policy failure. This is not because Iranians disagree with Ahmadinejad's sometimes belligerent and always defiant insistence that Iran will not give up its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- but because the result of that resolution is that tomatoes have, since the passage of the resolution, become unaffordable to the Iranian masses. The Holocaust conference in Tehran that preceded the U.N. vote is not derided so much because of its preposterous premise but because of the perception that it unfavorably swayed the U.N. vote, which has in turn resulted in tomatoes becoming unaffordable. The current Iranian administration's goading of President Bush and the U.S. government -- whether on Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian question or basic issues of Iranian and American power -- is not viewed as illegitimate. But it is seen as having resulted in unilateral U.S. economic sanctions (and undue U.S. pressure on European and Asian allies), which mean foreign letters of credit are essentially now unavailable to Iranian businesses. This will cause them to downsize, especially if sanctions continue or even expand, and will exacerbate Iran's already unenviable unemployment rate. Bush's speech on Jan. 10 was keenly watched and read in Iran, and its emphasis on aggressive confrontation with Iran, along with the subsequent raid on Iran's "consulate" in Irbil, Iraq, is viewed partly as a reaction to Ahmadinejad's foreign policy (and also, fatalistically, as evidence of unending U.S. hostility toward Iran). The muted European response to the seizure of Iranian "diplomats" in Iraq, however, is viewed as evidence of Ahmadinejad's unpopularity abroad, an unpopularity that has resulted in European banks agreeing to American demands that they curtail their dealings with Iran. (This is emphasized more than the threat to European banks' U.S. operations if they don't cooperate with U.S. policy.) Iranians here are neither shy nor fearful in expressing their dissatisfaction with their president. And as much as the White House wills it to be, Iran is neither a police state nor does it resemble a dictatorship along the lines of Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Kim Jong Il's North Korea, despite periodic crackdowns on journalistic freedom and free speech. Few people here feel the kind of oppressive air often heard about in the West. It's remarkable how freely people speak out, and drink liquor and smoke dope and have unmarried sex, without fear of a secret police. Depending on where one is in the country, Iran can feel like a modern southern European state or a peaceful and modernizing third-world country. And in terms of public opinion, a sense of President Ahmadinejad's stature in Iran is not unlike the sense of President Bush's stature one might now find in New York, or even in the Midwest. Since Ahmadinejad's popularity started falling precipitously at the end of 2006, the newspapers have been filled with extremely harsh criticisms of him and his government. If Ahmadinejad's honeymoon with both Iranian voters and the Iranian media has been even shorter-lived than Bush's (which was extended by the events of 9/11, as it was), it does not mean that he is politically doomed, nor does it even mean that he cannot regain his popularity. In the minds of Iranians, foreign policy is in some sense inextricably linked to the price of tomatoes. But it is by no means certain that Iranians, who seem to prefer that their president project a more benign image abroad, are willing to forgo what they believe to be nuclear independence in order to buy cheaper tomatoes. The most common political view expressed in Iran is one of justice and a nation's rights. For many decades Iranians have felt that their leaders have sold those rights away for a pittance, and foreign concepts of justice simply mean foreign hegemony and exploitation. The nuclear issue clearly fits into Iranians' worldview, and even those among the Westernized and highly educated population in Tehran -- which openly worries about war and believes President Ahmadinejad to be incompetent at best -- admitted to me in discussion about the nuclear standoff that Ahmadinejad is right in saying that the Americans "harf-e zoor meezanan," literally "speak in the words of force," but meaning that the Americans want to impose their views regardless of what is right or fair. However, the Iranian government has to carefully balance its foreign policy goals with economic programs. Iranian obsession with the price of tomatoes is evident in the airtime the subject still receives on national television and in Ahmadinejad's remark, widely ridiculed here, that people should shop in his neighborhood because the price of tomatoes at his corner bodega hasn't increased. Ahmadinejad actually was not too far off the mark with his quip, which was intended as much as a dig against the nation's elite as a defense of his economy. Still, his populist tone isn't putting tomatoes on the tables of the working classes. On a weekday afternoon at the Behjatabad bazaar, however, Tehran's chicest and most expensive outdoor food emporium, tomatoes of every variety are piled high in front of the vegetable stalls, and hawkers beckon the well-dressed shoppers to sample their wares. The exquisitely red tomatoes, out of reach for most south Tehrani residents, are bought by the kilo by men and women who pull up in their $120,000 Mercedeses and $60,000 BMWs, in a city otherwise filled with $8,000 Iranian-made cars. Many of them will go on to discuss the price they paid at dinner parties with the same seriousness they reserve for discussing the Dow Jones average or foreign-exchange rates. The open dissatisfaction with the Ahmadinejad government should be viewed as being not unlike the dissatisfaction European and Asian voters often express with their presidents and prime ministers, and not as a prelude to the fall of an entire political system, in this case the Islamic Republic. Other than the minority of elite and secular Tehranis who would like nothing better than some version of a Western democracy -- albeit only if their class can wield power -- it is hard to find anyone here who feels that an ideal Islamic democracy is an unachievable goal under the concept of "velayat-e faqih," or rule of the jurisprudent. "The people of Iran" to whom President Bush beckons do indeed desire freedom, and they consistently express themselves in what are reasonably fair elections (certainly if one includes the Florida and Ohio standards of 2000 and 2004). But it is a monumental mistake to presume that the freedoms they seek are precisely the same ones Americans do. One need only witness the massive participation in Shiite mourning ceremonies marking Tasua and Ashura at the end of January and beginning of February in Iran to grasp the fact that Iranians are by and large not only deeply religious but reasonably comfortable with the concept of velayat-e faqih, which is the fundamental philosophy of the Islamic Republic. Iran today is still very much a Shiite country and a source of inspiration to Shiites everywhere. In Yazd, for example, self-flagellation ceremonies at the Hazireh Mosque included large organized groups of Afghans and Iraqis, who beat themselves with chains with as much vigor as, if not more than, the locals.
It may be serendipitous for Ahmadinejad that his low point in popularity came both during Muharram, the most holy of Shiite months, and during the celebrations for the anniversary of the birth of the Islamic Republic. It is during these times that Iranians are most united -- particularly if faced by threats from abroad. From the anniversary of the day of Ayatollah Khomeini's arrival in Iran in 1979 (Feb. 1) until the anniversary of the victory of the Islamic revolution on Feb. 11, Iranian television broadcasts back-to-back documentaries on the revolution, Imam Khomeini (who is still very much viewed as a saint by a large part of the population), and foreign plots and intrigue against the Iranian people. Friday-prayer leaders and top officials across the country remind their bigger-than-usual crowds of the importance of unity in the face of outside threats, namely the U.S. and Israel. Even Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former hojatoleslam who is now ayatollah -- and Ahmadinejad's political nemesis -- has felt the need to toe the government line on Iran's nuclear policy, which rejects any preconditions for negotiations. On Feb. 2 in Yazd, the current Friday-prayer leader, the mild-mannered, moderate and very charming Hojatoleslam Sadoughi, leaned on an automatic rifle as he stood at the lectern. Sadoughi, who as prayer leader is also the supreme leader's representative in the region, subtly reminded his audience that the revolution is at all times ready to defend itself.
However, Iranians by and large do not believe that the United States will attack Iran, mostly because they cannot envision that the White House could be so very stupid. Perhaps, as I have suggested to some, they put too much faith in the wisdom of George W. Bush. One former Revolutionary Guard told me, with absolutely no animosity, that Americans could not be so foolish as to attack a country where 10-year-olds have been willing to strap grenades to their waists and run under enemy tanks (referring to the Iran-Iraq war). Iranians generally agree, albeit nervously, with their government that U.S. aggressiveness and recent military moves are part of a psychological war to frighten Iran. Whether or not that it is the case, the Bush administration would do well to remember that a prideful Shiite Iran will choose martyrdom over humiliation any day of the week. Yet Iranians are perhaps now more than ever willing to seek a rapprochement with the U.S., for both political and economic reasons. The attitude of the Iranian "street" is nowhere close to that of the Arab "street" today, and the sense of strength, even real power, that Iranians feel their nation wields means that they no longer see any downside to, nor feel threatened by, having relations with the United States. Sadly, all indications are that another milestone opportunity is about to be squandered in favor of confrontation. President Ahmadinejad, who is not the decision maker on Iran's nuclear policy nor even on Iran's foreign policy goals, will in all probability survive politically. But his long-term survival will be better ensured if his government tones down the rhetoric on the nation's nuclear prowess, so that any unreasonableness is viewed as coming only from Bush and the West. Equally important is Ahmadinejad's government getting a handle on the price of tomatoes.


Keeping All Options on the Table: A Roadmap to Negotiation or War? By Farideh Farhi


In the light of the passing of the late February deadline imposed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and Iran’s refusal to comply, Washington is abuzz with wildly diverse plans regarding how to deal with Iran. Just days after the deadline, on February 24, Vice President Dick Cheney reiterated the Bush administration’s long standing position that “all options are on the table" if Tehran does not suspend uranium enrichment activities. On the other side of the spectrum, the announcement that the U.S. will attend the regional security conference held in Baghdad on March 10th and is open to talks with the representatives of Iran who will also be attending has highlighted the possibility of direct negotiations between the two countries
Meanwhile, the Bush administration’s point man for dealing with Iran, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, insisting that a military conflict is neither “desirable” nor “inevitable,” has been publicly and confidently describing a complex strategy intent on creating a “diplomatic pincer moment–a diplomatic construct that would drive the Iranians to the negotiating table” under the terms or preconditions defined by the United States. The feverish diplomatic effort to maintain a unified international stance against Iran’s enrichment program, while at the same time fanning rumors about possible military action, continues to fuel pressure on Iran at the Security Council level. On the side, it has also led to financial restrictions by the U.S. as well as several Europeans banks, threats against Tehran’s alleged meddling in Iraq, incarceration of Iranian officials in Iraq, dispatching of two aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf, public calling of a strengthened U.S.-Arab coalition against Iran, all in the hope of keeping the Iranian regime off balance and guessing about U.S. intentions and capabilities. While this multi-faceted offensive looks quite clever, it is more a reflection of competing views that exists within the Bush administration–between those who want to push for regime change and those who consider the more incremental, evolutionary process of behavioral change as more realistic and less dangerous .More significantly, if the objective of U.S. policy is to force a weakened negotiating hand on Iran rather than a direct military confrontation, it is based on a serious misreading of contemporary politics in Iran and miscalculation regarding the unity with which all significant players in Iran will react in response to perceived efforts to weaken the regime.
Undersecretary Burns has stated he believes that the intense pressure is having an impact and will eventually nudge Iran to abandon its long-standing policies towards nuclear enrichment and the Middle East region as a whole. In making its move the Bush administration seems to be drawing from the memory of events in 1988 that culminated in a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. In that year, the United States sank a significant portion of Iran’s Navy, attacked an Iranian commercial Airbus, and gave Iraq intelligence that led to the destruction of two Iranian divisions with the help of chemical weapons. The reaction of war-wearied Ayatollah Khomeini, the then supreme leader of Iran, was to “drink from the poison cup” and accept a ceasefire with Iraq after recently revealed debates within the Iranian government about the dire state of the Iranian economy and the difficulties encountered in war-time recruitment. The Bush administration seems to have taken to heart the joke the Iranians often make about themselves that “Iranians do not respond to pressure unless it is lots of pressure.” In addition, realizing the Iranian public’s broad support for their government’s nuclear program and worried about further inflaming Iranian nationalism in case of a direct military attack, the U.S. strategy seems to have shifted to a policy of frightening the Iranian people of the consequences of the Iranian government's nuclear efforts. This “psychological war” does not necessarily preclude an actual war or attack but the thinking is that a militarily frightened and economically worried Iranian public or elite may pressure the hard-line government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and ultimately the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, whose assent is necessary in foreign policy matters, to recognize Iran’s fundamental weaknesses and the American strengths. And even if this did not happen and a military confrontation eventually occurs, the economic and political pressures imposed, like the economic pressures imposed, like those pursued during the 1953 American coup in Iran, are hoped to exacerbate the already fractious political environment inside Iran and subdue the Iranian public’s nationalism and reaction. The strategy is both flawed and dangerous because it does not take into account the important political changes that have taken place in Iran and the world since the end of Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It also misses the possibility that the Iranians are also playing an “all options on the table” game of their own. It is true that the Iranian leadership, like every other leadership, may not change course unless there is “lots” of pressure. But the change of course taken under intense pressure may not necessarily be what the U.S. hopes, unless provocation and war is really what the U.S. is seeking in its new policy. Contemporary Iran is very different from both 1953 and 1988. To be sure, Iran’s political environment continues to be highly contentious and fractured. But this contentious political environment is a source of strength rather than weakness, allowing for wide range of input in the decision making process. This is why the potential for enhanced economic and political pressure on Iran has intensified already existing internal debates about the unyielding rhetorical stance President Ahmadinejad has taken and his economic mismanagement and inflationary policies during difficult times. Recent debates show that for a broad spectrum of significant players and forces in Iran, the appeal of a negotiated settlement on the nuclear issue rests on the desire for improved economic conditions. But this desire can only be sustained if the Iranian leadership thinks that negotiations and compromise on the nuclear issue will indeed lead to a breakthrough in relations with the United States and on the abandoning of its policy of weakening the Iranian regime. Without such an incentive, the hardliners in Iran will be able to run the show based on the argument that no matter how many concessions are given, American hostility will not end. Slower economic growth is the price the Iranian hardliners, and ultimately other significant players as well, are willing to pay in exchange for domestic control especially since economic and financial sanctions that exclude oil trade cannot bring the Iranian economy to a halt. Hardliners are able to win the domestic debate on this issue so long as the U.S. remains insistent on negotiations with preconditions. Nothing short of a “patron-client” relationship will satisfy the U.S. administration, they argue. Given the Administration’s insistence on preconditions that they know none of the players in Iran can and will accept, those in favor of improved relations with the U.S. can do little to undermine the argument made by the hardliners. The opponents of Ahmadinejad’s hard-line policies and rhetoric, such as former presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, can and have invoked Iran’s international predicament to fortify their criticism of a political foe. At the same time, they have shown no hesitation at all closing ranks behind the hard-line position if they perceive the Islamic Republic or its vital interests to be at stake.
Ultimately, while there is quite a bit of disagreement and public debate in Iran about how to fend off American hostility, there is no evidence of a real rift within the regime on policy toward Iraq, on the right to domestic enrichment or on the aspiration to play a broader regional role. As such, the inflexible stance taken by the Bush administration on the enrichment issue, which precludes a concession, even a symbolic one, in return for enrichment suspension, will have little success in altering Iran’s underlying stance. It is seen as yet another example of the attempt to weaken the Iranian regime and not as meaningful incentive to compromise or a realistic path toward improved relations. This is while on issues critical to U.S. interests and regional stability, Tehran continues to hold strong cards; the least of which is the ability to just continue what it has been doing for nearly three decades, carry on while limping economically but carry on unless it is attacked through a land invasion. If the Bush administration’s charges against Iran are taken seriously, the Iranian hard-line leadership can also up the ante in Iraq, increasing the likelihood of retaliation by Iran, whether directly or through its allies. Such a policy will surely harm Iran, but will do the same to U.S. interests and further inflame the whole region. Of course, there is the greater danger of direct military confrontation. Most U.S. officials, Dick Cheney excepted, maintain that they have no intention of provoking one. Rather, in the face of Iranian overconfidence, they argue, the U.S. is building strength in anticipation of a negotiation. But, in the absence of real diplomatic engagement, and with both sides playing an open-ended game, the effort to weaken the Iranian hand will be exceedingly difficult to calibrate or control. The risks of accidental war are real and frightening unless the recent announcements regarding the possibility of negotiations with Iran represent a turn around reflective of a genuine desire to avert direct confrontation and further inflaming of an already destabilized region.

Farideh Farhi is an independent researcher and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa.